Protection versus compensation:

The class divide in advanced democracies

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Abstract

Much existing scholarship has studied the class divide in support for compensatory redistribution through taxation and social spending. While working-class voters are indeed more supportive of compensatory policies than their higher-class counterparts, this paper shows that there is a much greater class divide over 'protective' measures: policies that seek to protect workers' jobs and employment prospects through industrial subsidies, employment guarantees, tariffs, and immigration restrictions. Drawing on twenty years of survey data from sixteen advanced democracies, this paper documents this class divide and provides evidence linking it to distinctive working-class beliefs about the moral importance of work and the degradation associated with unemployment. Consistent with ethnographic work by Michèle Lamont, these beliefs are especially pronounced among working-class voters engaged in hard physical labor and are associated with greater support for protective measures. This paper's results indicate that the moral importance working-class voters assign to employment may lead them to see compensatory redistribution as an inadequate response to the disadvantages that people like them face and to favor protective policies despite the associated efficiency costs.

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The last decade has seen a resurgence of interest in class inequality in democratic representation. Existing scholarship has primarily focused on the implications of unequal representation for redistribution, arguing that governments' disproportionate responsiveness to the demands of higher-class citizens has led to less compensatory spending than would have arisen under conditions of equal responsiveness (Burgoon et al. 2022; Lupu and Pontusson 2023). Yet compensatory redistribution is not the policy domain with the greatest class-based disagreement. As shown in this paper, there is a considerably larger class divide over protective policies, including subsidies for firms in declining industries, job guarantees, limits on imports, and immigration restrictions. In contrast to compensatory policies, which address the cost of lost jobs and employment opportunities through transfer payments, protective policies aim to secure workers' jobs and to shore up the employment opportunities they possess on the basis of their existing skills.

What explains the distinctively sharp class divide over protective policies? This paper proposes that working-class voters' demands for protection are driven by distinctive views regarding the value of work and the moral degradation associated with unemployment. Following ethnographic scholarship by Lamont (2000) and theoretical work on endogenous belief formation by Bénabou and Tirole (2016), I argue that working-class citizens' distinctive valorization of work reflects the fact that they are disproportionately likely to be engaged in hard physical labor and have less access to other sources of socially recognized worth, such as cultural sophistication or academic credentials. This moral outlook, in turn, renders them more willing than their higher-class counterparts to tolerate the relatively high efficiency costs associated with protective policies in order to secure workers' jobs and reduce the need for compensatory social benefits.

This moral account of working-class demand for protective policies differs from conventional accounts based on individual-level exposure to labor market competition as well as cultural accounts centered on attitudes toward foreigners. A large literature finds limited support for the thesis that voters' preferences toward protective policies such as immigration

restrictions and tariffs are driven primarily by individual-level losses from foreign competition (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Frieden 2022). But this does not mean that voters' views on these issues are purely driven by cultural anxieties about foreigners and bear no relation to concerns about work and employment. Indeed, as we will see in this paper, the class divide over policies that deal with protection against foreign competition closely tracks the class divide over protective policies that are more unambiguously economic and have little direct relation to attitudes toward foreigners, such as industrial subsidies and job guarantees. Though cultural anxieties are surely relevant for immigration and trade attitudes, such accounts cannot by themselves explain the broader pattern of disproportionate working-class demand for protective policies.

Working-class voters' support for protective policies is better understood as reflecting a parochially sociotropic concern with preserving jobs and employment opportunities for people like themselves. Protective policies offer a way to shield the people they care about from the moral degradation associated with unemployment. According to the parochially sociotropic theory developed in this paper, working-class demands for both protection and compensation are increased by the relatively high exposure of members of the working class to economic risks. The distinctive value that working-class voters assign to employment increases the relative appeal of protective measures over compensatory ones for addressing these risks. This argument extends scholarship on the other-regarding economic determinants of trade and immigration policy preferences (Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2012; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) by integrating these accounts with a class-based account of differences in risk exposure and the moral importance of work.

The distinction drawn in this paper between protective and compensatory policies is related to recent scholarship in American politics that distinguishes between "predistributive" and "redistributive" policy interventions, the former referring to interventions that try to alter the market distribution of income instead of modifying it after the fact (Hacker 2011; Abbott et al. 2025; Malhotra and Vogel 2025; Kuziemko et al. 2026). But the "pre-

distribution" concept groups protective policies of the sort considered here together with social investment in education and retraining: both of these types of policies try to alter the market distribution of income, but do so in radically different ways. Protective policies aim to enhance workers' employment prospects on the basis of their existing skill endowments, whereas social investment policies try to transform these endowments. As this paper shows, working-class voters are distinctively supportive of protective policies but not of the social investment policies that also fall under the heading of "predistribution." This pattern is consistent with recent scholarship that has shown that higher-class voters are the most enthusiastic proponents of social investment and retraining (Häusermann et al. 2022; Busemeyer et al. 2023). This paper complements this scholarship by documenting class differences in support for protection and compensation, yielding a different overall assessment of how working-class preferences differ from those of higher-class voters. It extends beyond work on predistribution by developing and testing a theory that links working-class demands for protection to an underlying class divide in moral attitudes toward work.

This paper's empirical investigation draws on data from several rounds of the International Social Survey Programme's Role of Government module (1996, 2006, 2016; Philips et al. 2023) and National Identity module (1995, 2003, 2013; Kelley et al. 2020), which include sixteen advanced capitalist countries: France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the United States. I supplement these surveys with data from the European Social Survey's (ESS) 2008 and 2016 rounds (ESS ERIC 2023a; 2023b), which include nine of the countries on the ISSP, the European Values Survey (EVS) rounds of 1999, 2008, and 2017 (Gedeshi et al. 2022), which include ten of the countries on the ISSP, and data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES) from the United States (Kuriwaki 2025; Dagonel 2021). The paper also makes use of the ISSP's Work Orientations module (1997, 2005, 2015; Bacher et al. 2024) and its Social Networks module (2017; Muckenhuber et al. 2019).

The first part of the paper's analysis shows that working-class voters are much more likely than their higher-class counterparts to say that work is the most important part of life, that it is humiliating to receive money without having worked for it, and that unemployment and dependence on public benefits make people lazy. The second part documents the class divide over protective and compensatory policies: working-class voters are much more supportive of protective measures than are their higher-class counterparts, while the class divide over compensatory policies is relatively muted. These findings hold whether class is operationalized in terms of occupation or in terms of educational attainment and hold for both working-class men and women, as well as for ethnic minority members of the working class. The third part of the analysis corroborates the proposed mechanism by exploiting within-class variation, using a novel measure of physical work intensity at the occupational level. I show that beliefs about the moral importance of work predict an increase in the relative appeal of protection over compensation and that working-class voters in physically demanding jobs assign greater moral importance to work and are more supportive of protective policies than are other working-class voters. These results are consistent with the theory developed in this paper and are robust to tests aimed at addressing the confounding role of pocketbook self-interest in explaining the class divide.

This paper's findings suggest that the literature on class inequality in responsiveness should broaden its focus beyond compensatory redistribution. Given that there is an especially large class divide over protective policies, unequal responsiveness could have particularly important effects on policy outcomes in this domain. To the extent that governments respond disproportionately to higher-class citizens, greater responsiveness to the policy demands of working-class voters would be expected to shift policy in favor of protective measures alongside an increase in compensatory redistribution. Arguably, this would amount to a return to postwar 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982), a regime that is often construed as comprising 'free markets plus compensation' but which in fact entailed the use of a host of regulatory protections and exclusions to defend the economic prospects of native workers

(Milward 1999; Goodman and Pepinsky 2021). More broadly, this paper shows that policies that compensate workers for realized labor market risks should not be studied in isolation but should be considered alongside policies that try to protect workers from exposure to these risks in the first place.

1. Protection as an alternative to compensation

Scholars have long seen compensatory social policies as the main way in which governments in advanced democracies can address workers' exposure to labor market risks. Canonical scholarship by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Korpi and Palme (1998) focused on social insurance and transfer payments, while more recent political economy research argues that workers respond to labor market risks by demanding compensatory spending (e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2001; Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006; Rehm 2016).

Another tradition in comparative political economy has stressed that compensatory transfer payments are not the only way that working-class voters might try to address the economic risks they and people like them face. Scholars like Castles (1994) criticized Esping-Andersen and others for assuming that transfer payments were the main tool for addressing labor market disadvantage: as Castles (1985, 82-88) had argued in *The Working Class and Welfare*, regulatory protections, import restrictions, and immigration controls were other tools that governments used to try to afford workers security of employment and decent incomes. Castles saw these measures as constituting a "wage-earners' welfare state" that focused on guaranteeing that workers could earn a decent living through work rather than using social benefits to compensate those who were out of work. Similarly, scholars like Whiteside and Salais (1998) highlighted the role of employment regulations and protections against foreign competition as substitutes for compensatory social spending. In a related vein, Estévez-Abe (2008) emphasized that employment guarantees and state support for economically threatened firms could take the place of compensatory policies.

Scholarship in international political economy has long recognized that trade protection and compensation policies are substitutes for one another (Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1998). But this logic holds for the broader range of measures, including those not directly related to international competition. This is true, for example, of measures to restrict employers' control over dismissal, whether established by law or through union-imposed constraints on managerial prerogatives (Emmenegger and Marx 2021). By providing protection *against* unemployment, such restrictions can partially replace workers' dependence on compensation *for* unemployment. This distinction is consistent with recent work on responses to technological change in particular that has contrasted 'protective' responses to technological change, which involve measures to enhance employment security, against compensatory redistribution (Gallego et al. 2022). Measures ranging from dismissal restrictions and employment guarantees to industrial subsidies, tariffs, and immigration restrictions can all be described as *protective* policies in the sense that they try to protect workers' existing jobs or preserve alternative employment opportunities for those who happen to lose their jobs, rather than rendering unemployment more tolerable.

Voters' demand for protection and compensation is unlikely to be driven solely by calculations of these policies' effects on their own wages and employment prospects. In the literature on compensatory redistribution, it is increasingly recognized that pocketbook considerations play a limited role in determining voters' attitudes and that other-regarding considerations and social concerns exert an important impact on preferences (Dimick, Rueda, and Stegmueller 2018; O'Grady 2019; Trump 2021; Cavaillé 2023). The literature on preferences toward immigration and trade, the protective policies most extensively investigated in existing scholarship, has reached similar conclusions: considerations of the well-being of others appear to play an important role in the determination of attitudes in these domains (Lü et al. 2012; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Frieden 2022). This paper uses the term "sociotropic concerns" to capture these other-regarding considerations. Adapting the language from the literature on "parochial altruism" (Choi and Bowles 2007; Rueda 2018), I

propose that voters are *parochially* sociotropic in the sense that they place greater weight on the welfare of people like them, such as other members of the class of which they are a part. This reflects a middle ground between the view that voters' attitudes reflect immediate pocketbook concerns and the view that voters' attitudes reflect a 'sociotropic' concern for macroeconomic performance or aggregate national well-being (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). This paper uses the term "parochially sociotropic" instead of "parochially altruistic" because the argument does not require taking a position on whether human beings are fundamentally altruistic or whether other-regarding concerns are based on the belief that one's own welfare is implicated with the welfare of others in the long run. Nor does the argument require that voters think in terms of class or are prioritizing the welfare of fellow members of their class *qua* class members. It requires only that voters place greater weight on the welfare of people like them, which means that working-class voters tend to prioritize the welfare of other members of the working class and vice versa.

Sociotropic concerns do not in themselves determine what policies voters will prefer: voters must also decide what constitutes the welfare of the people they care about. This depends on the voter's own values or beliefs. A voter who ascribes a great deal of moral value to work and cares about another person's welfare is likely to think that it is important for that person to be employed. This would be the case inasmuch as the voter believes that work creates the opportunity for the development and exercise of certain traits or 'virtues' – endurance and dedication in the performance of unpleasant tasks, for example – that are intrinsically good for human beings to possess and which dignify the people who possess them. Insofar as a parochially sociotropic voter assigns this kind of value to work as a site of moral formation, she is likely to see compensatory benefits as inadequate substitutes for employment for the people she cares about, precisely because the lack of employment 'degrades' individuals in the sense of failing to afford them opportunities to develop and exercise the aforementioned virtues. Voters who ascribe high moral value to work can be

expected to tolerate higher efficiency costs in order to afford work opportunities to the people they care about.

2. Why working-class voters may favor protective policies

The notion that people assign non-material value to work is a longstanding one, going back to the study of workers in Marienthal, Austria in the early 1930s (Jahoda et al. 1971 [1933]) and extending to important recent work in this journal (Pelc 2025). The question of interest in this paper is why we might expect the moral importance assigned to work to vary systematically along class lines and to shape class differences in policy preferences. As Pelc (2025) observes, the notion that working-class individuals assign greater importance to work than their higher-class counterparts cannot be taken for granted. But there are, in fact, good reasons to think that working-class citizens ascribe greater moral significance to work than do higher-class citizens. Members of the working class are more likely to be engaged in physically demanding work and have less access to alternative sources of dignity or worth, such as academic qualifications, cultural sophistication, and so on. As argued by Lamont (2000), this leads members of the working class to place relatively high moral weight on the possession of traits associated with hard physical work and to discount other possible sources of dignity or worth. Lamont observes of working-class American men that

> [t]he very conditions in which these men work reinforce the importance they attach to being hardworking: their labor is often painful and time-consuming, yet underpaid, physically demanding, or psychologically challenging because repetitive. Being able to stick to it demands emotional energy and moral fortitude. Workers know this from their own experience and, again, often express admiration for others who can show persistence (Lamont 2000: 26).

She reached similar conclusions in her observations of French workers: like their American counterparts, French workers "equate a strong work ethic with moral character" and believe that "hard work allows [a person] to demonstrate [his] worth" even if he lacks other sources of dignity, such as academic credentials. Hard work is especially valorized by French workers "who describe their work as dirty and physically demanding or as requiring particular

willpower and perseverance" (Lamont 2000, 162). These workers valorize grit and endurance because these are traits that they possess and because they lack other possible sources of respect. Even if a given member of the working class is not engaged in hard physical work, he or she is likely to be in a familial and social network that includes people who are engaged in such work, shaping his or her conception of the virtues that 'hard' or 'real' work requires and inculcates. As Lamont argues, workers reaffirm the value and importance of hard work in part because they recognize that their own economic future depends on their commitment to hard work: continual reaffirmation of the value of hard work is a way of motivating oneself to continue to supply the effort upon which one's family depends.

Given their relative advantage in the performance of hard work and the associated virtues, we would expect members of the working class to ascribe especially high value to the virtues associated with hard work. This follows Lamont's account and is consistent with Bénabou and Tirole's (2016: 159-160) theory of endogenous belief formation, whereby people assign value to the traits or "identity-relevant capital" that they possess in order to avoid mental distress, to be more confident about the future, and to motivate themselves to act in a certain way. Consciously or not, working-class citizens valorize hard work because this makes them feel better about themselves and their future and because it encourages them to continue to work hard and to avoid the temptation to slack off. If working-class citizens ascribe especially high value to the traits associated with hard work, we would expect them to be distinctively concerned with the non-monetary losses associated with unemployment. Unemployment deprives individuals of the opportunity to exercise virtues that working-class citizens may see as distinctively valuable or important.

The implications of this class difference in the moral valuation of work for preferences over protective and compensatory policies can be illustrated through a simple formal model. In the model, which can be found in Appendix A, parochially sociotropic working-class and higher-class voters maximize the welfare of a representative member of their class. Working-class voters assign more non-material value to employment than do their higher-class coun-

terparts, reflecting their greater involvement in or social proximity to hard physical labor and their more limited access to alternative sources of socially recognized worth. Thus, even if working-class and higher-class voters were maximizing the welfare of the same representative citizen, they would assign different value to that worker being employed, based on their different understandings of the intrinsic importance of work for a person's well-being. But the representative members of the working and higher classes whose welfare the parochially sociotropic voters are maximizing also differ in their exposure to unemployment, reflecting the greater incidence of employment risks among members of the working class. The two class-based differences therefore operate at different levels: the value assigned to employment is characteristic of the voter and is shaped by her own occupational and social experiences, while unemployment exposure is characteristic of the representative class member whose welfare the voter is trying to maximize.

In the model, voters choose levels of protective and compensatory policies: protective policies reduce exposure to unemployment, whereas compensatory policies reduce the hardship associated with unemployment. Both incur an efficiency cost. The model generates a simple asymmetry between working-class and higher-class voters. Working-class citizens' greater exposure to unemployment increases the marginal benefit of both protection and compensation. In contrast, the greater non-material value that working-class voters assign to employment increases the marginal benefit of protection relative to compensation. Insofar as this leads voters to demand more protection, it may also partially crowd out compensation by reducing the risk of unemployment. The model therefore provides a rationale for the expectation that working-class voters should be more supportive of both protection and compensation while anticipating an especially sharp class divide over protective measures.

The assumption of parochially sociotropic concern is meant to capture a part of the way voters reason about public policies, not to suggest that pocketbook considerations are irrelevant. The key point is that we can expect working-class citizens' disproportionate exposure to the risk of job loss to influence the policy demands of working-class voters even

if these voters are not themselves exposed to the risk of unemployment. Voters' personal risk exposure may independently affect policy preferences, but the class divide need not be reducible to differences in personal risk exposure or other pocketbook channels. As shown in Appendix A, incorporating variation in personal risk exposure into the model does not eliminate the theoretical mechanisms identified above.

It is important to distinguish the 'Lamontian' argument developed here from other scholarship on working-class sociology, including research by Silva (2013) and Hochschild (2016). Though these works deal with related themes and generate some findings consistent with the argument here, the main thrust of these works is that contemporary working-class experiences engender a generic hostility to government intervention that extends beyond distaste for compensatory redistribution to a general embrace of 'the market.' This work provides little guidance about why working-class voters might favor protective policies over compensatory ones, since both types of policies involve government intervention. Evans and Tilley (2017) focus on class differences in support for government intervention in the economy but do not consider why we might observe a greater class divide over protective policies than over compensatory ones. To explain this difference in policy demands, we need an account of why working-class voters might assign distinctive value to employment and therefore endorse state intervention aimed at protecting jobs and employment opportunities, even at the expense of efficiency losses. That is what this paper provides, drawing on Lamont (2000).

It is also important to consider the possibility of variation by gender and race in working-class preferences. It is widely believed that working-class men are distinctively attached to 'hard work' for reasons related to masculinity. This is suggested by Lamont's focus on *working men*, although she does not conduct a comparison with working-class women. On the other hand, even if the capacity for 'hard work' is seen as a masculine virtue, working-class women may also place great weight on the possession of this virtue (e.g., in male partners and male children). They, too, may see unemployment as morally degrading (or even as emasculating). It is clearly wrong to presume that men are the only ones with strong views

about masculinity. Moreover, it is not obvious that capacity for 'hard work' is a distinctively masculine virtue: in contemporary economies, working-class women perform many of the most physically demanding and dirty jobs in cleaning, hospitality, food service, health care, and so on. Similar ambiguity arises with respect to the possibility of differences within the working class by race. Some would argue that working-class views on work and idleness are shaped by racial prejudice. This is, indeed, part of Lamont's argument about working-class attitudes in the United States and France (especially Lamont 2000: 172-178). On the other hand, there is good reason to think that minority and majority members of the working class *both* affirm the value of hard work, since both are deprived of the alternative sources of dignity or worth that higher-class individuals enjoy. Lamont herself identifies important similarities in attitudes toward work among white and black American workers (e.g., 28-29, 51). She also finds that many North African immigrants in France affirm the importance of hard work (202). The extent of preference heterogeneity by gender and race is therefore theoretically uncertain and will be investigated in what follows.

The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I test the theory's predictions regarding the relationship between class and beliefs about work and idleness. Then I test the predictions about the relationship between class and preferences over protective and compensatory policies. Finally, I use within-class variation in physical work intensity to assess whether the variation in beliefs and policy preferences corresponds to the theory of belief and preference formation developed above.

3. Class differences in the moral value of work

The first step of this paper's empirical analysis is to corroborate the claim that working-class voters assign greater non-material value to work than do their counterparts and, correspondingly, hold an especially negative view of unemployment and idleness. I use two methods to identify survey respondents as 'working class.' The primary method is based on an occupational definition of class, following existing scholarship in political science and

sociology. While there are several multifaceted class schemas in circulation, there is broad agreement among proponents of these schemas and others that manual, clerical, and lower-level service-sector jobs are "working-class" occupational groups (Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002; Oesch 2023; Häusermann et al. 2022; Carnes and Lupu 2023). I count respondents as working class if their 1-digit ISCO code is in categories 4-9, which contain the following groups: "clerical support workers," "service and sales workers," "skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery workers," "craft and related trades workers," "plant and machine operators and assemblers," and "elementary occupations." The variable takes a 1 if the respondent's occupation is in one of these groups and a 0 if his or her occupation falls in one of the other ISCO groups, which include "managers," "professionals," and "technicians and associate professionals." Retirees are assigned on the basis of their prior occupation. Individuals who do not report an occupation are assigned on the basis of their spouse's occupation (if they have one) and are otherwise not included in the analysis. The second method uses education as a proxy for class. This is a standard approach among scholars of American politics (e.g., Kuziemko et al. 2026), in part because American surveys less often collect occupational data (e.g., Carnes and Lupu 2021). Lamont (2000) herself defines working-class membership by the lack of a university degree. The educational class measure takes a 1 if the respondent does not have a university degree and a 0 if he or she does. As shown in Appendix Table C1, the occupation- and education-based measures of working-class membership perform similarly as predictors of subjective working-class identification.


To study class-based differences in attitudes toward work and unemployment, I draw on evidence from the International Social Survey Programme's Work Orientations (WO) and Social Networks (SN) modules along with evidence from the European Social Survey's 2016 round and several rounds of the European Values Survey (EVS). In all of these surveys, I only include respondents from countries that also participated in the ISSP Role of Government module. The numbers of respondents with complete covariate profiles in the relevant survey rounds are 9,697 (ISSP WO 1997), 15,356 (ISSP SN 2017), 34,946 (EVS 1999, 2008, 2017),

and 28,046 (ESS 2008, 2016). The distribution of respondents by country and summary statistics on respondent demographics are shown in Appendix B. I use four survey questions. The first asks respondents whether they agree or disagree that work is the most important activity in life (ISSP WO 1997). The second question asks respondents whether they think it is humiliating to receive money without having worked for it (EVS 1999, 2008, 2017). The third question asks respondents whether they think that people who do not work become lazy (EVS 1999, 2008, 2017). The fourth asks respondents whether they believe that social benefits make people lazy (ISSP SN 2017). The same question is asked on the 2008 and 2016 rounds of the ESS. All outcomes are rescaled from 0 to 1. Summary statistics for these surveys are reported in Appendix B.

The models estimated below include country and (for surveys with multiple years) year fixed effects, meaning that they control for time-invariant heterogeneity between countries as well as country-invariant heterogeneity between time periods. The models are estimated with ordinary least squares regressions and include heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. I include a standard set of individual-level control variables: gender, age (measured in 7 categories), and self-employment. I also include three dummy variables for employment status, indicating whether the respondent is employed, unemployed, or retired (meaning that the reference category is comprised of working-age people who are not in the labor force and thus neither employed nor unemployed). Appendix B reports the demographic characteristics of respondents in each survey.

The results in **Figure 1** are consistent with the account of working-class attitudes developed above. Compared to their higher-class counterparts, working-class respondents are significantly more likely to say that work is the most important activity in life, a finding that plausibly reflects the distinctive value that members of the working class assign to employment as a site of moral formation and as a venue for the exercise of the virtues associated with hard work. We also observe that working-class respondents are significantly more likely than their higher-class counterparts to say that it is humiliating to receive money without having

Figure 1: The class divide in beliefs about work, ISSP, EVS, and ESS.



The figure reports estimates and 95% confidence intervals with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. All outcomes are scaled from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating strong support. A coefficient greater than 0 indicates that working-class respondents are more supportive of the listed measure than are higher-class respondents. All models include country and year fixed effects and control for gender, age, self-employment, and employment status.

worked for it and that people who don't work become lazy. Both of these responses indicate a distinctive working-class distaste for idleness. Finally, we see that working-class respondents are much more likely than their higher-class counterparts to believe that social benefits make people lazy. The analyses of ISSP and ESS data yield similar results. The full regression tables for these analyses are reported in Appendix D, which also reports coefficients scaled by the standard deviation of the outcome variables. Appendix E investigates the possibility of attitudinal variation among different segments of the working class, showing that female and male, migrant and non-migrant, and union and non-union members of the working class significantly differ from their higher-class counterparts in the value they assign to work and their disdain for idleness. Indeed, in European countries, working-class respondents with a migration background are the *most* supportive of the claim that it is humiliating to receive

money without work and that people become lazy without work, indicating that adherence to these beliefs cannot be reduced to chauvinism among native workers.

4. Class differences in policy preferences

We can now assess the extent of the class divide in support for protective and compensatory policies. I do so using survey evidence from the ISSP's Role of Government module (1996, 2006, 2016), which includes 51,042 respondents with complete covariate profiles from the sixteen countries enumerated in the introduction, and the ISSP's National Identity module (1995, 2003, 2013), which includes 42,108 such respondents. The analysis considers four protective policies. The first asks respondents whether they think that the government should "support declining industries to protect jobs" (RG 1996, 2006, 2016). The second asks whether it should be the government's responsibility to "provide a job for everyone who wants one" (RG 1996, 2006, 2016). The third asks respondents whether they agree that their country "should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy" (NI 1995, 2003, 2013). The fourth asks respondents whether they agree that "the number of immigrants to my country nowadays should be [reduced]" (NI 1995, 2003, 2013). The outcome variables examined in what follows are measured on a 1-5 or 1-4 scale of agreement to disagreement. All of these outcomes are rescaled to run from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating strong agreement.


I use three questions to gauge support for compensatory policies. The first asks respondents whether they would like to see more government spending on unemployment benefits (RG 1996, 2006, 2016). The second asks respondents whether it should be the government's responsibility to "provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed" (RG 1996, 2006, 2016). The third asks respondents whether they believe that taxes are too low, about right, or too high for "those with high incomes" (RG 1996, 2006, 2016), which I rescale so that "1" indicates the belief that they are "too low." Although the revenue raised through progressive tax increases could in principle be spent on any kind of policy (including e.g., industrial sub-

sidies), I classify progressive tax increases as a compensatory measure because most existing scholarship on "compensatory redistribution" sees progressive taxation and compensatory spending as two sides of the same coin (e.g., Lupu and Pontusson 2023). An additional advantage of these questions is that, taken together, they capture compensatory measures that could be described as "redistribution from" (i.e., taking from the rich) and "redistribution to" (i.e., giving to the disadvantaged), in the terms of Cavaillé and Trump's (2015) theory. We can thus assess whether such distinctions are important for the class divide in support for compensatory redistribution.

The models estimated here are the same in structure as those in the previous section: they include country and year fixed effects, report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, and use the same individual-level controls, with the addition of a control for public sector employment that was not consistently available for the surveys used in the previous section. **Figure 2** summarizes the results from separate models using the occupation-based and education-based definitions of working-class status: full regression tables can be found in Appendix Tables F1-F2. These results reveal three key findings. First, working-class respondents are more supportive of protective and compensatory policies than are their higher-class counterparts. Second, the class gap in support for protective policies is considerably greater than the class gap in support for compensatory policies. This holds true whether class is operationalized by occupation or by education. Appendix Table F3 uses difference-in-estimates z-tests to more formally demonstrate the significance of the difference in the magnitude of the class gap over protective and compensatory measures. Third, the class gap over different types of protective policies is quite similar, even though some of these policies are directly related to foreign competition and others are not. This suggests that the class divide over protection is not reducible to class differences in attitudes toward foreigners. All of these findings are consistent with the theory developed in section 2. The results do not meaningfully change with a binary coding of the outcomes (Appendix Tables F4 and F5), with an alternative coding of "don't know" responses (F6 and F7), or when scaling coefficients by

standard deviations in the outcome (F8 and F9). Appendix G shows that controlling for union membership and partisan affiliation does not change these findings.

Figure 2: The class divide in support for protective and compensatory policies in 16 advanced democracies, 1995-2016



The figure reports estimates and 95% confidence intervals with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. All outcomes are scaled from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating strong support. A coefficient greater than 0 indicates that working-class respondents are more supportive of the listed measure than are higher-class respondents. All models include country and year fixed effects and control for gender, age, public sector employment, self-employment, and employment status.

Appendix H investigates cross-national heterogeneity by dividing advanced democracies in the ISSP into Anglophone, Continental, Nordic, and East Asian countries, broadly following conventional welfare-state typologies. The results by country groups show that the summary findings reported above are reflective of a fairly consistent pattern across the advanced democratic world. The pattern is clearest in the Anglophone and Continental countries. In the Nordic countries, the class divide over protective measures is equivalent in magnitude to

the divide observed in the Anglophone and Continental countries. But the class divide over compensatory measures is somewhat greater in the Nordic countries than in the Anglophone and Continental countries, so the difference in the extent of the class divide over protective and compensatory measures is smaller. The East Asian countries show a relatively limited class divide over protective measures but an even smaller class divide over compensatory measures.

Appendix J examines heterogeneity by gender and unionization. Evidence from the ISSP shows that working-class women and men are both more supportive of protective measures than are higher-class respondents. Similarly, union and non-union members of the working class are more supportive of all protective measures than are higher-class respondents. Since ISSP surveys do not consistently gauge respondents' ethnicity or race, I draw on data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES), a long-running American survey to investigate heterogeneity by race. The results of the CES, reported in Appendix L, show that although white members of the working class are the strongest supporters of protective policies like trade and immigration restrictions, non-white members of the working class are also much more supportive of protective measures than are white higher-class voters. This evidence shows that distinctive working-class demand for protection is not confined to white men or unionized or non-unionized workers.

5. Assessing the determinants of the class divide

Having documented the class divide in beliefs about the value of work and in support for protective and compensatory policies, we can assess the proposed explanation for these differences. The first step is to show that beliefs about the value of work and the degrading nature of unemployment correspond to the relative appeal of protective and compensatory policies in the way proposed by the theory. The ability to test this claim is limited because questions about work beliefs and questions about policy preferences are typically found on different surveys. The 2008 round of the ESS, however, gauges respondents' agreement with

the claim that social benefits make people lazy along with their views about the extent to which it is the government's responsibility to provide a job guarantee (a protective policy) and a decent standard of living for the unemployed (a compensatory policy). We can thus directly test whether the relative appeal of protection over compensation is higher among respondents who believe that social benefits make people lazy. This is an especially informative test because the two questions ask about close substitutes (providing a job versus providing support for those without a job), are phrased in the same way, and ask about the government taking responsibility for the well-being of those threatened by labor market disadvantage: the question is about *which* form of state intervention is relatively more appealing to those who think that social benefits make people lazy, a belief that is disproportionately held among working-class voters (see section 3 above). The outcome variable in **Table 1** is constructed by deducting each respondent's support for compensation (scaled 0-1) from her support for protection (scaled 0-1), yielding a scale that ranges from -1 to 1. The coefficient captures the relationship between a one-standard-deviation increase in agreement with the claim that social benefits make people lazy and the relative appeal of protection over compensation. The results support this paper's theory: as concern with degradation associated with unemployment increases, the relative appeal of protection over compensation increases as well. This is true for the full sample (column 1) and among working-class respondents in particular (column 2). The full regression table with coefficients for all control variables is reported in Appendix M.

Next, we can assess the argument that exposure to physically demanding work shapes beliefs about work and, by extension, support for protective policies. The theory developed in Section 2 predicts that greater individual-level exposure to physically demanding work correlates with a stronger belief in the intrinsic value of employment and a corresponding endorsement of the view that unemployment is degrading. This is not to say that personal involvement in hard physical work is the sole determinant of class-based differences in the value assigned to employment: as discussed in section 2 and elaborated formally in Appendix

Table 1: Work beliefs and support for protection over compensation, ESS 2008

	Dependent variable:	
	Protection over compensation	
	Full sample	*Working class only*
Benefits make people lazy (1-SD increase)	0.030^{***} (0.005)	0.024^{***} (0.005)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,746	10,749
Note:	$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	


A, we would also expect working-class voters' views to be shaped by the fact that many of the people around them are engaged in hard physical work (Appendix T), even if they themselves are not. But the theory predicts that personal engagement in hard physical work is an important contributor to beliefs about the moral importance of work. If true, we would expect variation in physical work intensity to lead to within-class variation in work beliefs and within-class variation in parochially sociotropic support for protection.

To construct a measure of variation in exposure to physically demanding work, I draw on the ISSP Work Orientations module, which asks respondents how frequently they perform physically exhausting work at their job. I aggregate the 28,841 individual responses into mean physical work intensity scores for 38 ISCO 2-digit occupational groups, providing a fairly fine-grained measure of occupational variation in physical work intensity. The 2-digit level of occupational aggregation is commonly used to measure other occupational characteristics such as skill specificity, routine task intensity, and offshorability, which are discussed below. I assign this occupational measure of physical work intensity to respondents in all of the surveys on the basis of their ISCO codes. An advantage of this approach is that the measure reflects the average reported experience of dozens or hundreds of workers in each occupational group, not the assessment of any one survey respondent. Details about this measure can be found in Appendix N, where the physical work intensity score for every 2-digit ISCO group is reported

alongside the number of responses used to generate each occupation-level score. The ISCO groups with the highest scores are "building and related trades workers," "market-oriented skilled agricultural workers" (along with a related occupational group for forestry and fishery workers), and "labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport." The ISCO groups with the lowest scores are "business and administration professionals," "information and communications technology professionals," and "legal, social and cultural professionals."

Using this measure, **Figure 3** examines attitudinal variation *among* working-class respondents on the basis of the physical work intensity of their occupation. The left-hand panel shows the correlation between physical work intensity and beliefs about the intrinsic importance of work and the degradation associated with unemployment. The right-hand panel shows the correlation between physical work intensity and support for protective policies. The reported coefficients capture the relationship between a one-standard-deviation increase in physical work intensity and each of the outcomes shown in the figure. The figure makes clear that working-class respondents in physically demanding jobs are significantly more likely to assign high non-material value to work and to support protective policies than are other working-class respondents who are in less demanding jobs. The full results are in Appendix Tables N2 and N3. Appendix Tables N4 and N5 demonstrate a similar relationship when restricting the analysis to working-class women, indicating that the relationship between physical work intensity, the value of work, and support for protection extends across gender lines. Within-class variation on the basis of physical work intensity is what we would expect on the basis of the theory developed in section 2, since personal experience with physically demanding work is expected to shape the importance that a voter assigns to employment, changing one of the parameters in the voter's parochially sociotropic maximization problem and increasing their support for protection. There is a more modest relationship between work physicality and support for immigration restrictions than for the other protective policies, suggesting the importance of other personal characteristics for attitudes in this domain.

Figure 3: Physical work intensity, beliefs about work, and demand for protection among working-class respondents



The sample in the analyses above is restricted to working-class respondents following the occupational definition of class (ISCO 4-9). The figures report estimates and 95% confidence intervals with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. All outcomes are scaled from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating strong support. All models include country and, where applicable, year fixed effects and control for gender, age, self-employment, and employment status. The analyses of policy preferences also include a control for public sector employment available in these surveys. In the left-hand figure, (a) refers to ISSP SN and (b) refers to ESS 2016.

Table 2 assesses the relationship between physical work intensity and the relative appeal of protection and compensation, using the ISSP Role of Government's (1996, 2006, 2016) questions about the extent to which it is the government's responsibility to provide a job guarantee (protection) and to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (compensation). As in the analysis in Table 1 above, the respondent's support for compensation (ranging 0-1) is deducted from their support for protection (ranging 0-1), yielding an outcome variable that ranges from -1 to 1. The coefficients in Table 2 report the relationship between a one-SD increase in the physical work intensity of the respondent's occupation and support for protection over compensation. The left-hand column includes all respondents,

while the right-hand column focuses solely on variation among working-class respondents. This evidence further supports the theory developed above: physical work intensity predicts greater support for protection relative to compensation among respondents at large and among working-class respondents. The full table can be found in Appendix Table N6.

Table 2: Physical work intensity and support for protection over compensation, ISSP

	Dependent variable:	
	Protection over compensation	
	Full sample	*Working class only*
Physical work intensity	0.032^{***}	0.015^{***}
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	44,887	24,076
Note:	$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

When it comes to the role of employment risk in driving the class divide, the theory developed in section 2 distinguished between voters' *personal* exposure to the risk of unemployment and the average exposure of members of their class (i.e., the exposure of the representative class member). Since the theory proposes that voters are optimizing in a parochially sociotropic way, class-based differences in average risk exposure are the theoretically relevant quantities. Appendix O shows that members of the working class are generally more exposed to the risk of unemployment and, on average, have higher levels of skill specificity than their higher-class counterparts, meaning that it is more difficult for them to find a similar new job once they experience job loss. This is based on data from Rehm (2016) and Pardos-Prado and Xena (2019). The same Appendix also draws on data from Blinder and Krueger (2013) and Goos et al. (2014) to show that members of the working class are generally much more exposed to the employment risks associated with globalization and technological change. The argument of this paper is that working-class citizens' greater average exposure to these risks can be expected to lead parochially sociotropic working-class

voters, who place a special premium on employment, to demand more compensation and especially more protection than their higher-class counterparts. The class difference in respondents' policy demands is not, I argue, reducible to differences in respondents' *individual* risk exposure, which varies substantially among members of the working class on the basis of their occupations.

To assess whether the class divide documented in this paper is really a product of differences in respondents' personal risk exposure, Appendix O re-estimates models of the class divide in policy preferences including standard measures of personal risk exposure, including occupational unemployment rates, skill specificity, offshorability, and routine task intensity, drawn from the sources cited in the preceding paragraph. These occupational measures have been used to explain variation in support for protective and compensatory policies, as in Dancygier and Walter (2015), Owen and Johnston (2017), Pardos-Prado and Xena (2019), and Thewissen and Rueda (2019). The results do not meaningfully differ from the baseline estimates of the class divide reported in section 4, indicating that the class divide is not explained by the measured dimensions of personal risk exposure. This also holds when using the educational definition of class, as shown in Appendix O. Moreover, with the exception of support for immigration restrictions, the inclusion of these risk variables does not undermine the significance of the relationship between physical work intensity and demand for protection among working-class respondents (Appendix O), indicating that physical work intensity is a distinct and important dimension of variation among working-class voters. All of these findings are consistent with the theory developed above. To be clear, this does not mean that individual-level risks are irrelevant for explaining preferences toward the policies studied here. Indeed, there is a large body of evidence showing that individual risk exposure matters (Rehm 2016; Serrano-Serrat 2026a; 2026b). The point here is that the class divide is not reducible to these differences. A full account of the determinants of individual attitudes would take into account both the parochially sociotropic channel studied in this

paper and the personal exposure channel studied in other work, in addition to other possible determinants of variation in policy preferences.

Several tests are reported in the Appendix to further assess the possible role of personal risk exposure or pocketbook self-interest in the class divide documented above. Adding a control for income has little impact on the estimated class divide, as shown in Appendix L with American data from the CES, given the absence of consistent income measures on the ISSP. Appendix P assesses whether the class divide is driven by the priorities of working-class labor market 'insiders' (Rueda 2007). These results show that employed and unemployed members of the working class are both much more supportive of protective policies than are higher-class voters: if anything, unemployed members of the working class are the most supportive of protective policies. This is not what we would expect if the class divide were a product of the demands of employed insiders.

If self-interested concerns about employment security drove disproportionate working-class demand for protective policies, we would also expect the class difference over issues like trade protection to significantly diminish or disappear among workers in non-tradable jobs. As shown in Appendix Q, however, this is not what we see: instead, the class divide is just as stark among respondents in the non-tradable public sector as in the private sector. Meanwhile, the class divide among respondents in non-offshorable occupations is actually larger than the divide among respondents in offshorable occupations. To further assess whether the class divide is reducible to pocketbook considerations, Appendix R compares the class divide in work beliefs and policy preferences among respondents in the labor force to the class divide among retirees, following an approach developed by Jeannet (2018). If the class divide were driven by differences in pocketbook self-interest, the class divide among retirees should considerably narrow, given their detachment from the labor market and the adverse effect of protective measures on the prices of the goods and services that retirees consume. If work experiences and parochial sociotropic concerns drive the class divide, the class divide over work beliefs and policy preferences should persist in retirement. As we

see in Appendix R, the class divide among retirees is generally similar to the one among respondents in the labor force, further corroborating the conclusion that the class divide is not reducible to pocketbook considerations related to individual labor market risks.

6. What about social investment?

The preceding sections have provided strong support for the predictions of the theory concerning the class divide over protective and compensatory policies and the determinants thereof. These two policy categories do not, however, exhaust the range of policy tools at governments' disposal to assist workers disadvantaged by the market. Also relevant are *social investment* policies, which primarily involve education and retraining (Beramendi et al. 2015). In contrast to compensatory policies, which try to reduce the hardship associated with job loss through transfer payments and related measures, social investment policies try to enhance workers' employment prospects by endowing them with marketable skills. In contrast to protective policies, which try to secure workers' existing jobs and the employment opportunities they possess on the basis of their existing skill endowments, social investment policies try to enhance workers' employment prospects by transmitting new skills.

As mentioned in this paper's introduction, a limitation of the concept of 'predistribution' as used in recent research on the United States is that it lumps together protective and social investment policies, since both of these policy types attempt to affect the market distribution of income rather than relying on compensation. But in addition to the conceptual difference noted above, there is an important empirical reason to treat these policy areas as distinct: the class divide over social investment policies looks nothing like the class divide over protective policies. This is shown in Appendix S. Higher-class survey respondents are generally more supportive of social investment policies than their working-class counterparts, both when they face an unconstrained choice (spending more on university education) and when they face a constrained choice (reducing unemployment insurance to fund retraining).

This finding is consistent with recent work by Häusermann et al. (2022) and Busemeyer et al. (2023), who show that higher-class voters are more likely to prioritize social investment over other policies, especially in constrained budget scenarios. The argument of this paper complements these scholars' work. The point of this paper is to add a third policy lever to the comparison: while working-class voters are more supportive of compensation than their higher-class counterparts, there is an even bigger class divide over protective policies. And while higher-class voters may prefer social investment over compensation, the theory and evidence in this paper suggest that they may favor compensation over protection. This yields a different overall picture of class differences in policy attitudes.

Since many protective policies do not have a direct fiscal impact, assessing the relative appeal of protective, compensatory, and social investment policies requires moving beyond the fiscal tradeoff paradigm to a broader conception of policy tradeoffs: protective, compensatory, and social investment policies all have fiscal and/or efficiency costs that must be weighed against their efficacy in terms of yielding outcomes that voters want. Voters' choice of the optimal bundle of these costly policies is likely to vary along class lines. The theory developed in this paper focuses on preferences over protection and compensation and does not itself explain the class divide over social investment policies. It seems likely, as suggested by Häusermann et al. (2022), that working-class citizens are skeptical about the ability of social investment policies to deliver good results for people like them, but adjudicating these issues requires different data than those used in this paper.

7. Conclusion and implications

This paper has provided new facts about the class divide in policy preferences across the advanced capitalist world and new evidence in support of a theory that accounts for this divide. While existing scholarship has stressed the class divide over compensatory redistribution, this paper highlights that there is a considerably greater class divide over protective policies, which aim to protect workers' jobs rather than compensating them for job loss af-

ter the fact. These policies include subsidies for firms in declining industries, employment guarantees, protection against imports, and immigration restrictions. Building on Lamont's (2000) insights, this paper has developed a theory linking class differences in the nature of work to beliefs about the moral importance of employment and, in turn, to voters' preferences over protective and compensatory policies. Working-class citizens' distinctive beliefs about the importance of employment may render them more willing to tolerate the efficiency costs associated with protective policies to achieve desirable employment outcomes for people they care about. Using a novel occupation-level measure of physical work intensity, the paper has provided evidence connecting workers' moral beliefs and their policy preferences to their own involvement in physically demanding work. The paper thus contributes a theoretical framework, supported by new empirical evidence, to the growing body of scholarship on working-class policy demands (Kuziemko et al. 2026; Abbott et al. 2025).

The class-based differences in policy preferences documented in this paper are important to consider alongside some prominent trends in advanced democracies over the last forty years. As shown in Appendix U, advanced democracies have experienced a steep decline in the industrial employment share along with a surge in imports from the developing world and a doubling of the foreign-born share of the population between 1980 and 2016. To a great extent, these trends reflect forces outside of policymakers' control. But to the extent that policy choices played a role, unequal representation emerges as a candidate explanation, especially in light of class differences in policy preferences documented in this paper. If responsiveness in existing democracies is biased toward higher-class preferences, greater equality in responsiveness would be expected to shift policy toward working-class preferences across the range of issues studied here. Such a shift might yield a policy configuration reminiscent of postwar "embedded liberalism," which combined relatively generous compensation with robust protective measures, including the imposition of restrictions on the movement of goods and people across borders (Freeman 1975; Kahler 1985; Hollifield 1992; Milward 1999), state support for industry to preserve jobs and ease adjustment (Price 1981; Da-

ley 1996; Federico and Foreman-Peck 1999), and employment commitments undergirded by controls on capital mobility (Hall 1986; Helleiner 1994; Eichengreen 1996).

More generally, this paper highlights the need for political economists to study preferences for protective measures alongside compensatory redistribution instead of treating these policies in isolation from one another. Crucial questions remain about when and why citizens prefer one policy lever over another to address the problems that they and people like them face. Most importantly, scholars should be cautious not to presume a certain 'appropriate' response to labor market disadvantage through their choice of dependent variables in research on citizens' attitudes. We must consider a wider range of policies through which voters might seek to address labor market risks and inequalities, including policies that try to protect workers against losses rather than trying to make up for these losses after the fact.

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Appendix A: Theory formalization

The theory can be illustrated through a simple model in which voters seek to maximize the welfare of a representative member of their class. This is what is characterized as "parochially sociotropic" behavior in the paper. Voters are indexed by i and are either working-class or higher-class, $k(i) \in \{W, H\}$. Each voter differs in the value she or he assigns to the employment of the representative member of her class. The non-material value that voter i assigns to the representative class member's employment is denoted ϕ_i. This is a function of both the average physical work intensity of voter i's employment experiences, λ_i, and the average physical work intensity of the employment experiences of the people in his or her family and social network, μ_i, where $\lambda_i, \mu_i \geq 0$. Thus $\phi_i = \phi_0 + \alpha\lambda_i + \beta\mu_i$, where $\phi_0 \geq 0$ is a shared baseline value of work and α and β are weights where $\alpha, \beta > 0$. Working-class jobs are on average more physically demanding than higher-class jobs, so working-class voters tend to have employment experiences that are more physically intensive than their higher-class counterparts: $\bar{\lambda}_W > \bar{\lambda}_H$. Working-class voters tend to be in familial and social networks with other working-class voters, while higher-class voters tend to be in familial and social networks with other higher-class voters, so $\bar{\mu}_W > \bar{\mu}_H$. Working-class voters therefore assign higher value to the employment of a representative member of their class than do their higher-class counterparts on average:

$\bar{\phi}_W - \bar{\phi}_H = \alpha(\bar{\lambda}_W - \bar{\lambda}_H) + \beta(\bar{\mu}_W - \bar{\mu}_H) > 0$

Thus $\bar{\phi}_W > \bar{\phi}_H$. This formulation captures the class divide in the value assigned to employment while allowing for substantial variation in ϕ among members of a given class depending on values of λ and μ.

Voter i maximizes the welfare of a representative member of her class, $k(i)$. The representative members of the two classes differ in their exposure to unemployment, captured by a scalar $r_k > 0$ for $k \in \{W, H\}$ where $r_W > r_H$. The latter scales a common unemployment risk function $\pi(p)$ that is decreasing and convex. The expression $r_k\pi(p) \in [0, 1]$ therefore denotes the probability that a representative member of a given class is unemployed at a

level of protection p. $\pi'(p) < 0$, meaning that higher levels of protection reduce exposure to unemployment. To isolate the theoretical channels of interest here, the representative class member's income in employment is normalized to 1. When out of work, the representative class member receives c in compensation, which ranges from zero up to but below their income in employment ($0 \leq c < 1$). This captures the key distinction between protective and compensatory policies: protective policies reduce exposure to unemployment, whereas compensatory policies reduce the hardship associated with unemployment. The voter chooses a level of protection p and a level of compensation c to maximize the welfare of the representative member of their class. Both p and c are economically distortionary and impose a cost $D(p, c)$ on the representative class member irrespective of employment status, where D is increasing and convex. The parochially sociotropic voter maximizes the welfare of the representative member of her class, but the voter's maximization problem is affected by her own view of the intrinsic value of employment ϕ_i. This captures the idea that voters unavoidably bring their own view about what constitutes the welfare of others when they try to maximize others' welfare. The parochially sociotropic voter is therefore maximizing the following objective function:

$$V_i(p, c; \phi_i) = [1 - r_{k(i)}\pi(p)](1 + \phi_i) + r_{k(i)}\pi(p)c - D(p, c)$$

This is the expected welfare of a representative class member as evaluated by voter i and is comprised of the employment income of the representative member of her class plus the non-wage benefit that i assigns to that representative member's employment, $1 + \phi_i$, times the probability that the representative member is employed $1 - r_{k(i)}\pi(p)$, plus compensation c times the probability that the representative member is out of work $r_{k(i)}\pi(p)$, minus the distortionary cost of protection and compensation $D(p, c)$, which falls on the representative member irrespective of employment status.

Differentiating with respect to p and collecting terms, we find that $V_{i,p} = -r_{k(i)}\pi'(p)(1 + \phi_i - c) - D_p(p, c)$. Assuming an interior optimum, this optimum lies where the marginal benefit of an increase in protection equals its marginal cost: $-r_{k(i)}\pi'(p)(1+\phi_i-c) = D_p(p, c)$.

The marginal benefit term has an intuitive interpretation: additional protection reduces the probability of the representative class member's unemployment by $-r_{k(i)}\pi'(p) > 0$, while the welfare gain from employment relative to compensated unemployment is $1 + \phi_i - c$. Differentiating the marginal value of protection with respect to unemployment risk $r_{k(i)}$, we find that $V_{i,p,r} = -\pi'(p)(1 + \phi_i - c)$. Since $1 + \phi_i > c$ and $\pi'(p) < 0$, we can conclude that $V_{i,p,r} > 0$, meaning that the marginal benefit of protection increases as the representative class member's unemployment risk $r_{k(i)}$ rises. Now differentiating the marginal benefit of protection with respect to the non-material benefit of employment ϕ_i, we arrive at $V_{i,p,\phi} = -r_{k(i)}\pi'(p)$. Since $\pi'(p) < 0$, this expression is strictly positive, meaning that the marginal benefit of protection rises as the value assigned to employment ϕ gets larger. Given the specification of ϕ above, the marginal benefit of protection therefore increases with both the physical work intensity of voter i's own employment experience and that of members of her family and social network. Further differentiating with respect to $r_{k(i)}$, we see that $V_{i,p,\phi,r} = -\pi'(p)$, which is always positive. This shows that the effect of a greater value of employment on the marginal benefit of protection increases as unemployment exposure rises. In other words, the two channels are mutually reinforcing: for parochially sociotropic voters who assign a high value to employment, the marginal benefit of protection rises as the unemployment risk of the representative class member increases.

Turning to compensation, we find when differentiating the objective function with respect to c that $V_{i,c} = r_{k(i)}\pi(p) - D_c(p, c)$. At an interior optimum, the marginal benefit of an increase in compensation equals its marginal cost: $r_{k(i)}\pi(p) = D_c(p, c)$. Differentiating the marginal benefit term with respect to $r_{k(i)}$, we find that $V_{i,c,r} = \pi(p)$. Since $\pi(p)$ is positive, this means that the marginal value of compensation increases with the representative class member's risk exposure r_k, as one would expect. By contrast, when we differentiate the marginal benefit term with respect to ϕ_i, we find that $V_{i,c,\phi} = 0$, meaning that the value assigned to employment has no direct effect on the marginal benefit of compensation. An increase in ϕ_i may, however, have an indirectly negative effect inasmuch as it induces greater

protection: since $\pi'(p) < 0$, greater protection reduces the probability of unemployment and therefore the marginal benefit of compensation. Protection may thus partially crowd out compensation in equilibrium.

The model's key implication comes from a comparison of the marginal values of protection and compensation, which were derived above:

$\frac{MB_p}{MB_c} = \frac{-r_{k(i)}\pi'(p)(1+\phi_i-c)}{r_{k(i)}\pi(p)} = \frac{-\pi'(p)}{\pi(p)}(1+\phi_i-c)$

Since $r_{k(i)}$ cancels out of the expression, class-based differences in risk exposure do not affect the relative marginal benefit of protection over compensation at any given policy bundle (i.e., when p and c are fixed). Taking the derivative of this ratio of marginal benefits with respect to ϕ_i while holding p and c constant, we find that

$\frac{\partial}{\partial\phi_i}\left(\frac{MB_p}{MB_c}\right) = \frac{-\pi'(p)}{\pi(p)}$

Since $\pi'(p) < 0$ and $\pi(p) > 0$, this partial derivative is positive. This means that the marginal benefit of protection relative to compensation is increasing in the non-material value assigned to employment ϕ_i. So while the disproportionate risk exposure of the working class increases the marginal value of *both* protection and compensation, the higher non-material value assigned to employment by working-class voters increases the marginal benefit of protection over compensation. Among working-class voters, the model suggests that the relative appeal of protection over compensation should be higher for those with higher ϕ, which is a function of their own physical work intensity (λ) and that of members of their family and social network (μ). The physical work intensity of the respondent's own job is more straightforwardly measurable than the physical work intensity of others in the respondent's network, so λ is the focus of the empirical analysis of within-class variation in section 5.

To be clear, the model is not meant to imply that voters' policy views are solely determined by parochially sociotropic considerations. Concerns about individual risk exposure surely matter as well, as theorized and documented by Rehm (2016) and others. The model developed above is intentionally stark to capture the theoretical channel of interest in this

paper. Incorporating variation in personal risk exposure does not alter the conclusions above. To see this, let r_i denote voter i's exposure to unemployment, in contrast to $r_{k(i)}$, which denotes the exposure of the representative class member. Let voter i care about both her own welfare and that of the representative class member, with weight $\theta \in (0, 1)$ assigned to the former and $1 - \theta$ to the latter. Assuming the voter assigns the same value to employment and faces the same efficiency costs when evaluating her own welfare and that of the representative class member, her objective function then has the same form as above but with $\tilde{r}_i$ replacing $r_{k(i)}$, where $\tilde{r}_i = \theta r_i + (1 - \theta) r_{k(i)}$. In this setting, personal unemployment risk increases the marginal value of protection and compensation. But even among voters with the same personal risk exposure, differences in the value of ϕ across voters in different classes continue to generate differences in the marginal benefit of protection, while differences in the risk exposure of the representative class member $r_{k(i)}$ continue to affect the marginal value of both protection and compensation. The theory therefore provides a rationale for expecting the class divide to persist after controlling for personal risk exposure.

Appendix B: Summary statistics for the surveys used

Table B1 below reports the number of observations with complete covariate profiles for each cross-national survey. ISSP RG refers to the International Social Survey Programme's Role of Goverment module. The 1996, 2006, and 2016 rounds are included here (as noted in the main text, the 1985 and 1990 waves are excluded because they do not contain occupational codes necessary to code the class variable). ISSP NI refers to the ISSP's National Identity module. The 1995, 2003, and 2013 rounds are included here. ISSP WO refers to the ISSP's Work Orientations module. The 1997, 2005, and 2015 rounds are used to construct the physical work intensity measure. The ESS refers to the European Social Survey's 2008 and 2016 rounds. EVS refers to the European Values Survey. The 1999, 2008, and 2017 rounds are included here. **Tables B2**, **B3**, **B4**, **B5**, and **B6** report summary statistics for covariates and outcomes in each of these surveys.

Table B1: Number of complete observations by country and dataset

Country	ISSP RG	ISSP NI	ISSP WO	ISSP SN	ESS	EVS
AUL	4726	4119	2832	1209	-	-
CAN	1478	1857	1374	-	-	-
CHE	4042	2184	4311	1024	3133	4151
DEU	5238	3668	4130	1651	5174	5309
DNK	2133	2378	2904	930	1518	5425
ESP	6195	2773	3745	1560	3932	3118
FIN	2084	2237	2141	1022	1806	2887
FRA	4185	3229	3166	1451	3815	4429
GBR	2377	1666	2615	1540	1768	3705
IRL	1863	2965	928	-	2470	1562
JPN	2067	1554	1966	1500	-	-
KOR	2398	2230	-	-	-	-
NOR	3438	4038	4110	-	2934	2157
NZL	2644	1454	2204	1273	-	-
SWE	2126	2038	2272	1068	1496	2203
USA	4048	3718	4056	1128	-	-
Total	51042	42108	42754	15356	28046	34946

Table B2: ISSP Role of Government summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	51,042	0.510	0.500	0	1
Age category	51,042	3.729	1.632	1	7
Public sector	51,042	0.238	0.426	0	1
Self-employed	51,042	0.131	0.337	0	1
Employed	51,042	0.634	0.482	0	1
Unemployed	51,042	0.040	0.196	0	1
Retired	51,042	0.171	0.376	0	1
Union member	51,042	0.291	0.454	0	1
Working class (education)	51,042	0.752	0.432	0	1
Working class (ISCO)	51,042	0.542	0.498	0	1
Working class (subjective)	11,025	0.348	0.476	0	1
Support declining	49,054	0.643	0.279	0	1
Job guarantee	48,804	0.564	0.331	0	1
Spend more unemp.	48,886	0.513	0.239	0	1
Provide unemployed	48,460	0.630	0.279	0	1
Raise taxes high incomes	47,077	0.589	0.278	0	1
Spend more education	49,580	0.724	0.205	0	1
Provide aid to students	49,308	0.752	0.249	0	1

Table B3: ISSP National Identity summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	42,108	0.516	0.500	0	1
Age category	42,108	3.695	1.618	1	7
Public sector	42,108	0.272	0.445	0	1
Self-employed	42,108	0.107	0.310	0	1
Employed	42,108	0.641	0.480	0	1
Unemployed	42,108	0.042	0.201	0	1
Retired	42,108	0.168	0.374	0	1
Union member	42,108	0.262	0.440	0	1
Working class (education)	42,108	0.743	0.437	0	1
Working class (ISCO)	42,108	0.546	0.498	0	1
Restrict imports	40,457	0.577	0.292	0	1
Restrict immigration	38,082	0.662	0.264	0	1

Table B4: ISSP Work Orientations Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	42,754	0.523	0.499	0	1
Age category	42,754	3.694	1.610	1	7
Public sector	42,754	0.265	0.441	0	1
Self-employed	42,754	0.106	0.308	0	1
Employed	42,754	0.672	0.469	0	1
Unemployed	42,754	0.038	0.190	0	1
Retired	42,754	0.156	0.363	0	1
Union	42,754	0.273	0.445	0	1
Working class (education)	42,754	0.737	0.440	0	1
Working class (ISCO)	42,754	0.542	0.498	0	1
Work most important	9,427	0.518	0.302	0	1

Table B5: ISSP Social Networks summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	15,356	0.526	0.499	0	1
Age category	15,356	4.147	1.704	1	7
Public sector	15,356	0.279	0.449	0	1
Self-employed	15,356	0.114	0.318	0	1
Employed	15,356	0.591	0.492	0	1
Unemployed	15,356	0.036	0.187	0	1
Retired	15,356	0.251	0.434	0	1
Working class (education)	15,356	0.625	0.484	0	1
Working class (ISCO)	15,356	0.531	0.499	0	1
Benefits lazy	14,692	0.540	0.311	0	1

Table B6: ESS summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	28,046	0.501	0.500	0	1
Age category	28,046	3.931	1.746	1	7
Public sector	28,046	0.284	0.451	0	1
Self-employed	28,046	0.121	0.326	0	1
Employed	28,046	0.590	0.492	0	1
Unemployed	28,046	0.054	0.226	0	1
Retired	28,046	0.253	0.435	0	1
Working class (education)	28,046	0.747	0.435	0	1
Working class (ISCO)	28,046	0.551	0.497	0	1
Benefits lazy	27,688	0.527	0.279	0	1

Table B7: EVS summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	34,946	0.515	0.500	0	1
Age category	34,946	3.948	1.720	1	7
Self-employed	34,946	0.055	0.229	0	1
Employed	34,946	0.607	0.489	0	1
Unemployed	34,946	0.042	0.200	0	1
Retired	34,946	0.265	0.441	0	1
Union	34,946	0.212	0.408	0	1
Working class (education)	34,946	0.871	0.336	0	1
Working class (ISCO)	34,946	0.550	0.497	0	1
Migration background	28,457	0.187	0.390	0	1
Money humiliating	34,338	0.535	0.307	0	1
Lazy without work	34,393	0.606	0.300	0	1

Appendix C: Class measures and subjective class identification

Table C1 below assesses the predictive power of the education-based and occupation-based definitions of working-class membership for subjective working-class identification. The data is from the 1996 round of the ISSP Role of Government Survey, in which approximately 35% of respondents identified as working class. The options on the survey were to identify as "lower class," "working class," "lower middle class/upper working class," "middle class," "upper middle class," and "upper class." The outcome variable in the regression below takes a 1 if the respondent identifies as "working class" and a zero otherwise. The results do not change if we adopt a more expansive definition of subjective working-class identification by including lower class and lower middle class/upper working class (not shown). In this case, too, education- and occupation-based definitions of class have similar predictive power.

Table C1: Working-class membership and subjective working-class identification

	Dependent variable:	
	Subjective working-class identification	
	(1)	(2)
Working class (no degree)	0.247^{***}	
	(0.043)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.257^{***}
		(0.036)
Female	-0.072^{***}	-0.059^{**}
	(0.021)	(0.019)
Age category	-0.019^{**}	-0.016^{*}
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Employed	0.014	0.016
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Unemployed	0.210^{***}	0.188^{**}
	(0.059)	(0.059)
Retired	0.014	0.014
	(0.022)	(0.024)
Public sector	-0.097^{***}	-0.070^{***}
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Self-employed	-0.111^{**}	-0.094^{**}
	(0.043)	(0.033)
Constant	0.334^{***}	0.362^{***}
	(0.030)	(0.025)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	11,025	11,025
R^2	0.130	0.163

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix D: Analysis of work beliefs

Table D1 below provides the full regression output for the results summarized in Figure 1 of the main text. The discussion of the data sources can be found in the main text. **Table D2** reports the results with an alternative coding of the outcome variables in which "don't know" responses are assigned the midpoint value (0.5 on a 0-1 scale) rather than being excluded from the analysis. The results are similar. **Table D3** reports the results with coefficients scaled in terms of standard deviations of the outcomes.

Table D1: Class and beliefs about work and effort

	Dependent variable:									
	Work most important		Money humiliating		Lazy without work		Benefits lazy (ISSP-SN)		Benefits lazy (ESS)	
Working class	0.053***		0.049***		0.090***		0.107***		0.092***	
(no degree)	(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.015)		(0.015)	
Working class		0.056***		0.038***		0.071***		0.062***		0.057***
(ISCO 4-9)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.012)		(0.010)
Female	−0.044***	−0.044***	−0.009	−0.009	−0.052***	−0.052***	−0.020**	−0.023**	0.002	−0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age category	0.040***	0.042***	0.008*	0.009*	−0.003	−0.002	−0.008*	−0.005	−0.012***	−0.010***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.003	−0.002	0.035**	0.038**	0.059***	0.064***	0.063***	0.055***	0.017*	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Unemployed	0.058*	0.056*	0.007	0.005	−0.051*	−0.054*	−0.044**	−0.049**	−0.068***	−0.072***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Retired	0.019	0.016	0.052***	0.055***	0.082***	0.086***	0.048**	0.047**	0.043***	0.044***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Self-employed	0.028***	0.032***	0.013	0.017	0.032***	0.039***	0.046***	0.047***	0.044***	0.049***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Constant	0.279***	0.289***	0.418***	0.435***	0.475***	0.507***	0.532***	0.548***	0.421***	0.468***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Class measure	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO
Year FE	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,427	9,427	34,338	34,338	34,393	34,393	14,692	14,692	27,688	27,688
R^2	0.092	0.095	0.020	0.020	0.054	0.057	0.082	0.065	0.063	0.053

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D2: Class and beliefs about work and effort (DK at midpoint)

	Dependent variable:									
	Work most important		Money humiliating		Lazy without work		Benefits lazy (ISSP-SN)		Benefits lazy (ESS)	
Working class	0.053***		0.049***		0.090***		0.104***		0.091***	
(no degree)	(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.015)		(0.015)	
Working class		0.055***		0.037***		0.070***		0.060***		0.056***
(ISCO 4-9)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.012)		(0.010)
Female	−0.044***	−0.043***	−0.009	−0.009	−0.052***	−0.051***	−0.020**	−0.023**	0.002	−0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age category	0.040***	0.041***	0.008*	0.009*	−0.003	−0.002	−0.008*	−0.005	−0.012***	−0.010***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.003	−0.002	0.035**	0.037**	0.058***	0.063***	0.059***	0.052***	0.017*	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Unemployed	0.057*	0.055*	0.007	0.005	−0.051*	−0.054*	−0.043**	−0.048**	−0.067***	−0.071***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Retired	0.020	0.017	0.052***	0.054***	0.081***	0.085***	0.044**	0.043**	0.042***	0.043***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Self-employed	0.029***	0.032***	0.013	0.017	0.032***	0.039***	0.045***	0.046***	0.043***	0.048***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Constant	0.281***	0.290***	0.419***	0.437***	0.475***	0.506***	0.533***	0.548***	0.422***	0.468***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Class measure	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO
Year FE	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,560	9,560	34,787	34,787	34,807	34,807	15,161	15,161	28,024	28,024
R^2	0.091	0.094	0.019	0.020	0.054	0.056	0.079	0.063	0.062	0.052

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D3: Class and beliefs about work and effort (SD-standardized outcomes)

	Dependent variable:									
	Work most important		Money humiliating		Lazy without work		Benefits lazy (ISSP-SN)		Benefits lazy (ESS)	
Working class	0.177***		0.160***		0.301***		0.343***		0.330***	
(no degree)	(0.022)		(0.026)		(0.034)		(0.050)		(0.052)	
Working class		0.184***		0.123***		0.236***		0.199***		0.204***
(ISCO 4-9)		(0.028)		(0.023)		(0.031)		(0.039)		(0.035)
Female	−0.147***	−0.145***	−0.029	−0.028	−0.174***	−0.172***	−0.066**	−0.074**	0.006	−0.004
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Age category	0.134***	0.138***	0.027*	0.029*	−0.009	−0.005	−0.027*	−0.017	−0.042***	−0.037***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Employed	−0.009	−0.007	0.114**	0.123**	0.196***	0.213***	0.201***	0.177***	0.061*	0.042
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Unemployed	0.193*	0.185*	0.022	0.017	−0.171*	−0.180*	−0.141**	−0.158**	−0.245***	−0.257***
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Retired	0.063	0.053	0.171***	0.178***	0.274***	0.287***	0.153**	0.151**	0.154***	0.158***
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Self-employed	0.094***	0.105***	0.043	0.056	0.106***	0.130***	0.148***	0.151***	0.158***	0.175***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.033)
Constant	−0.792***	−0.759***	−0.380***	−0.324***	−0.437***	−0.332***	−0.025	0.025	−0.377***	−0.212***
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.079)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.058)
Class measure	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO	Edu	ISCO
Year FE	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,427	9,427	34,338	34,338	34,393	34,393	14,692	14,692	27,688	27,688
R^2	0.092	0.095	0.020	0.020	0.054	0.057	0.082	0.065	0.063	0.053

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix E: Heterogeneity in work beliefs by gender, migration background, and union membership

Table E1 below examines variation in work beliefs by gender, migration background, and union membership, using EVS data. Respondents are coded as having a migration background if they were not born in their country of residence or if at least one of their parents was not. The header 'money' refers to the EVS question that asks whether it is humiliating to receive money without having worked for it. The header 'lazy' refers to the EVS question that asks whether people who don't work become lazy.

Table E1: Attitudes toward welfare and work by gender, migration background, and union membership (EVS 1999, 2008, 2017)

	Dependent variable:					
	Money	Lazy	Money	Lazy	Money	Lazy
Ref cat: higher-class male						
Higher-class female	−0.018***	−0.062***				
	(0.005)	(0.005)				
Working-class female	0.028***	0.018***				
	(0.005)	(0.005)				
Working-class male	0.029***	0.061***				
	(0.005)	(0.005)				
Ref cat: higher-class native						
Higher-class migrant			0.025***	0.012+		
			(0.007)	(0.007)		
Working-class migrant			0.070***	0.102***		
			(0.007)	(0.006)		
Working-class native			0.042***	0.074***		
			(0.004)	(0.004)		
Ref cat: higher-class non-union						
Higher-class union					−0.055***	−0.057***
					(0.006)	(0.006)
Working-class union					0.016*	0.042***
					(0.006)	(0.006)
Working-class non-union					0.027***	0.061***
					(0.004)	(0.004)
Female			−0.006+	−0.052***	−0.008*	−0.051***
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age category	0.009***	−0.002	0.007***	−0.004**	0.010***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Employed	0.039***	0.065***	0.040***	0.067***	0.042***	0.069***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Unemployed	0.006	−0.053***	0.007	−0.059***	0.007	−0.052***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Retired	0.017*	0.039***	0.011	0.038***	0.010	0.031***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Self-employed	0.055***	0.087***	0.068***	0.098***	0.051***	0.082***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.439***	0.512***	0.448***	0.554***	0.439***	0.509***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	34,338	34,393	27,985	28,025	34,338	34,393
R^2	0.021	0.057	0.025	0.068	0.023	0.060

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix F: Policy preferences

Tables F1-F2 below provide the full regression tables for the results summarized in Figure 2 of the main text. The coding of the control variables is discussed in the main text. For the indicator variables designating employment, unemployment, and retirement, the reference group is working-age respondents who are not in the labor force. **Table F3** presents the results of difference-in-estimates z-tests to assess the significance of the difference in the magnitude of the class divide in support for protective and compensatory policies. **Tables F4-F5** report results with outcome variables that have been converted to binary measures

instead of 4- or 5-point scales from 0 to 1. For these analyses, the outcome variable takes a 1 if the respondent expresses support or strong support and a 0 otherwise. The results of these analyses are consistent with the baseline findings. **Tables F6-F7** report results when "don't know" responses are assigned the midpoint of the outcome scale (0.5) instead of being dropped. **Tables F8-F9** report results with the coefficients scaled by the standard deviation of the outcome variable. **Tables F10-F11** investigate change over time in the magnitude of the class gap.

Table F1: Class and attitudes toward protective policies

	Dependent variable:							
	Support declining		Job guarantee		Restrict imports		Restrict immigration	
Working class (no degree)	0.111***		0.087***		0.129***		0.116***	
	(0.008)		(0.013)		(0.009)		(0.008)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.097***		0.097***		0.104***		0.080***
		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.008)		(0.007)
Female	0.073***	0.074***	0.052***	0.053***	0.055***	0.057***	0.008	0.010^{+}
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age category	−0.010***	−0.008***	−0.004	−0.003	0.009***	0.013***	0.006^{+}	0.009**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.012*	−0.012**	−0.036***	−0.033***	−0.010*	−0.008**	0.005	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Unemployed	0.032***	0.026***	0.057***	0.051**	0.008	0.007	0.027**	0.026**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Retired	0.004	0.006	−0.003	−0.001	0.020**	0.022***	0.014*	0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Public sector	0.004	0.005	0.014^{+}	0.018**	0.005	0.003	−0.021***	−0.025***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Self-employed	−0.037***	−0.031**	−0.044***	−0.038***	0.007	0.014	−0.007	−0.003
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.484***	0.512***	0.427***	0.435***	0.570***	0.599***	0.525***	0.561***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	49,054	49,054	48,804	48,804	40,457	40,457	38,082	38,082
R^2	0.122	0.123	0.163	0.171	0.139	0.135	0.111	0.100

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The z-tests in **Table F3** assess the significance of the difference between the coefficients for each of the protective policies and the coefficient for "spend more on unemployment." For the purposes of these z-tests, I use the "spend more on unemployment" outcome as representative of support for compensatory policies in general because there is a relatively consistent and strong class divide in support for this policy, making it a relatively hard test for the significance of the difference in support for protective policies and support for

Table F2: Class and attitudes toward compensatory policies

	Dependent variable:					
	Spend more unemployed		Provide unemployed		Raise taxes high incomes	
Working class (no degree)	0.030***		−0.001		0.024*	
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.012)	
Working class (ISCO)		0.045***		0.026***		0.039***
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.009)
Female	0.015***	0.015***	0.018***	0.018***	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age category	0.011***	0.012***	0.008**	0.008**	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.023**	−0.021*	−0.033***	−0.030***	0.009*	0.012**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Unemployed	0.097***	0.094***	0.082***	0.081***	0.046***	0.043***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Retired	−0.022*	−0.021*	−0.019*	−0.018*	0.014	0.016
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Public sector	0.010*	0.014**	0.016***	0.021***	0.036**	0.040***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Self-employed	−0.053***	−0.050***	−0.043***	−0.041***	−0.039***	−0.036***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.336***	0.331***	0.534***	0.515***	0.424***	0.418***
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	48,886	48,886	48,460	48,460	47,077	47,077
R^2	0.164	0.170	0.161	0.163	0.088	0.091

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

compensatory policies. As can be seen in the table, the coefficient on each of the protective policies is significantly different from the coefficient on spending more on unemployment.

Table F3: Test for the significance of the difference of the magnitude of the class divide in support for protective and compensatory measures

Class	Outcome	Compared to	Estimate 1	Estimate 2	Difference	SE
Working class (no degree)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.111	0.030	0.081***	0.012
Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.097	0.045	0.052***	0.010
Working class (no degree)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.087	0.030	0.057***	0.016
Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.097	0.045	0.052***	0.011
Working class (no degree)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.129	0.030	0.098***	0.013
Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.104	0.045	0.059***	0.010
Working class (no degree)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.116	0.030	0.085***	0.012
Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.080	0.045	0.036***	0.009

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table F4: Class and attitudes toward protective policies, binary outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	Support declining		Job guarantee		Restrict imports		Restrict immigration	
Working class (no degree)	0.177***		0.113***		0.182***		0.195***	
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.154***		0.128***		0.148***		0.137***
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Female	0.117***	0.118***	0.071***	0.072***	0.072***	0.074***	0.009+	0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age category	−0.014***	−0.010***	−0.011***	−0.008***	0.017***	0.022***	0.012***	0.017***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.021***	−0.021***	−0.048***	−0.044***	−0.018*	−0.015*	0.008	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Unemployed	0.037***	0.027*	0.061***	0.053***	0.011	0.009	0.041**	0.040**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Retired	0.001	0.004	−0.002	0.001	0.022*	0.026**	0.020+	0.023*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Public sector	0.003	0.004	0.016**	0.022***	0.002	0.000	−0.039***	−0.046***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Self-employed	−0.057***	−0.048***	−0.064***	−0.056***	0.014+	0.024**	−0.012	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.318***	0.362***	0.406***	0.414***	0.513***	0.554***	0.309***	0.370***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	49,054	49,054	48,804	48,804	40,457	40,457	38,082	38,082
R^2	0.109	0.110	0.131	0.138	0.116	0.114	0.090	0.082

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table F5: Class and attitudes toward compensatory policies, binary outcomes

	Dependent variable:					
	Spend more unemployed		Provide unemployed		Raise taxes high incomes	
Working class (no degree)	0.074***		−0.016***		0.054***	
	(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.096***		0.018***		0.073***
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.005)
Female	0.013***	0.014***	0.025***	0.025***	0.011*	0.012*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age category	0.011***	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***	0.020***	0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.042***	−0.038***	−0.039***	−0.035***	0.018**	0.022**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Unemployed	0.160***	0.154***	0.078***	0.077***	0.085***	0.081***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Retired	−0.039***	−0.036***	−0.017*	−0.016*	0.022*	0.024**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Public sector	0.006	0.012*	0.030***	0.035***	0.057***	0.062***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Self-employed	−0.071***	−0.064***	−0.062***	−0.060***	−0.068***	−0.063***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	0.036***	0.033***	0.585***	0.559***	0.234***	0.230***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	48,886	48,886	48,460	48,460	47,077	47,077
R^2	0.136	0.142	0.111	0.111	0.074	0.077

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table F6: Class and attitudes toward protective policies (DK at midpoint)

	Dependent variable:							
	Support declining		Job guarantee		Restrict imports		Restrict immigration	
Working class (no degree)	0.108***		0.085***		0.125***		0.109***	
	(0.008)		(0.013)		(0.009)		(0.008)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.093***		0.094***		0.101***		0.076***
		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Female	0.070***	0.071***	0.050***	0.051***	0.052***	0.054***	0.003	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age category	−0.010***	−0.008***	−0.005	−0.003	0.009***	0.012***	0.006*	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.010+	−0.010*	−0.035***	−0.032***	−0.008*	−0.006*	0.007	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Unemployed	0.031***	0.026***	0.057***	0.052***	0.009	0.008	0.027**	0.027**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Retired	0.005	0.006	−0.002	0.000	0.020**	0.023***	0.019**	0.021***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Public sector	0.005	0.005	0.014+	0.018**	0.005	0.004	−0.020***	−0.023***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Self-employed	−0.037***	−0.031***	−0.044***	−0.038***	0.007	0.014+	−0.008	−0.004
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	0.487***	0.515***	0.431***	0.439***	0.572***	0.601***	0.524***	0.558***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	50,279	50,279	50,298	50,298	41,737	41,737	41,804	41,804
R^2	0.117	0.117	0.159	0.167	0.136	0.132	0.103	0.092

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table F7: Class and attitudes toward compensatory policies (DK at midpoint)

	Dependent variable:					
	Spend more unemployed		Provide unemployed		Raise taxes high incomes	
Working class (no degree)	0.030***		−0.002		0.022*	
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.011)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.043***		0.024***		0.035***
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.008)
Female	0.014***	0.014***	0.016***	0.016***	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age category	0.010***	0.011***	0.007**	0.007**	0.010***	0.011***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.021*	−0.019*	−0.031***	−0.028***	0.011**	0.013***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Unemployed	0.096***	0.094***	0.083***	0.082***	0.043***	0.041***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Retired	−0.021*	−0.020*	−0.018*	−0.017*	0.014	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Public sector	0.010*	0.014**	0.015***	0.020***	0.035***	0.038***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Self-employed	−0.052***	−0.049***	−0.043***	−0.041***	−0.037***	−0.034***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.338***	0.334***	0.534***	0.517***	0.426***	0.421***
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	50,316	50,316	50,271	50,271	50,268	50,268
R^2	0.159	0.164	0.158	0.159	0.082	0.085

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table F8: Class and attitudes toward protective policies (SD-standardized outcomes)

	Dependent variable:							
	Support declining		Job guarantee		Restrict imports		Restrict immigration	
Working class (no degree)	0.400***		0.263***		0.440***		0.439***	
	(0.029)		(0.040)		(0.032)		(0.029)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.347***		0.292***		0.357***		0.305***
		(0.027)		(0.027)		(0.026)		(0.026)
Female	0.263***	0.267***	0.158***	0.160***	0.188***	0.193***	0.030	0.036+
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Age category	−0.036***	−0.028***	−0.013	−0.008	0.032***	0.044***	0.023+	0.034**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Employed	−0.042*	−0.041**	−0.110***	−0.101***	−0.033*	−0.027**	0.019	0.019
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.114***	0.092***	0.172***	0.154**	0.027	0.024	0.101**	0.100**
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Retired	0.015	0.021	−0.009	−0.002	0.068**	0.077***	0.054*	0.062**
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Public sector	0.015	0.017	0.043+	0.055**	0.016	0.010	−0.080***	−0.095***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Self-employed	−0.132***	−0.112**	−0.134***	−0.115***	0.023	0.047	−0.027	−0.010
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Constant	−0.570***	−0.470***	−0.413***	−0.389***	−0.024	0.076*	−0.520***	−0.381***
	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.085)	(0.079)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	49,054	49,054	48,804	48,804	40,457	40,457	38,082	38,082
R^2	0.122	0.123	0.163	0.171	0.139	0.135	0.111	0.100

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table F9: Class and attitudes toward compensatory policies (SD-standardized outcomes)

	Dependent variable:					
	Spend more unemployed		Provide unemployed		Raise taxes high incomes	
Working class (no degree)	0.127***		−0.004		0.087*	
	(0.037)		(0.032)		(0.042)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.188***		0.093***		0.141***
		(0.027)		(0.026)		(0.031)
Female	0.064***	0.064***	0.064***	0.063***	0.017	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Age category	0.046***	0.049***	0.028**	0.028**	0.041***	0.042***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Employed	−0.098**	−0.088*	−0.120***	−0.107***	0.034*	0.042**
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Unemployed	0.405***	0.394***	0.293***	0.288***	0.165***	0.156***
	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Retired	−0.094*	−0.089*	−0.068*	−0.064*	0.052	0.057
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Public sector	0.043*	0.058**	0.056***	0.073***	0.131**	0.143***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Self-employed	−0.223***	−0.209***	−0.154***	−0.145***	−0.140***	−0.130***
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Constant	−0.746***	−0.765***	−0.346***	−0.412***	−0.595***	−0.616***
	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.088)	(0.079)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	48,886	48,886	48,460	48,460	47,077	47,077
R^2	0.164	0.170	0.161	0.163	0.088	0.091

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table F10: Change in the magnitude of the class gap over time

dataset	outcome	year	Class gap	Change vs baseline
RG	Support declining	1996	0.117 (0.011)	Reference
RG	Support declining	2006	0.096 (0.008)	-0.021* (0.009)
RG	Support declining	2016	0.080 (0.007)	-0.037** (0.011)
RG	Job guarantee	1996	0.097 (0.010)	Reference
RG	Job guarantee	2006	0.095 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.012)
RG	Job guarantee	2016	0.099 (0.011)	0.002 (0.013)
NI	Restrict imports	1995	0.102 (0.006)	Reference
NI	Restrict imports	2003	0.113 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)
NI	Restrict imports	2013	0.095 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)
NI	Restrict immigration	1995	0.059 (0.017)	Reference
NI	Restrict immigration	2003	0.096 (0.008)	0.037* (0.017)
NI	Restrict immigration	2013	0.076 (0.009)	0.017 (0.019)
RG	Spend more unemp.	1996	0.040 (0.011)	Reference
RG	Spend more unemp.	2006	0.049 (0.008)	0.009 (0.010)
RG	Spend more unemp.	2016	0.044 (0.008)	0.004 (0.013)
RG	Provide unemployed	1996	0.031 (0.010)	Reference
RG	Provide unemployed	2006	0.023 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)
RG	Provide unemployed	2016	0.025 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.010)
RG	Raise taxes high incomes	1996	0.042 (0.010)	Reference
RG	Raise taxes high incomes	2006	0.047 (0.011)	0.005 (0.014)
RG	Raise taxes high incomes	2016	0.028 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.014)

Table F11: Adjusted average level of support for industrial support and immigration restrictions by class and survey year

Outcome	Year	Higher class	Working class
Support declining	1996	0.571 (0.013)	0.689 (0.014)
Support declining	2006	0.595 (0.007)	0.691 (0.008)
Support declining	2016	0.601 (0.009)	0.681 (0.007)
Restrict immigration	1995	0.652 (0.024)	0.711 (0.034)
Restrict immigration	2003	0.606 (0.012)	0.702 (0.009)
Restrict immigration	2013	0.609 (0.015)	0.685 (0.015)

As **Table F10** shows, the only questions on which we see significant change in the magnitude of the class gap over time are "support declining," where the class gap declines, and "restrict immigration," where the class gap increases. **Table F11** shows that the decline in the class gap over "support declining" appears to be driven by an increase in support among higher-class respondents, paired with a mild decrease in support among working-class respondents. The increase in the class gap over "restrict immigration" appears to be driven by a decline in support for immigration restrictions among higher-class respondents that outpaced the mild reduction in support among working-class respondents.

Appendix G: Main results with union and party controls

Controls for trade union membership and partisanship are omitted from the baseline specification in Appendix F because trade union membership and partisan affiliation are likely to be endogenous to respondents' political attitudes. **Tables G1-G2** below show that the findings do not change substantially if a control for union membership is added. Respondents are classified as union members if they report that they are currently a union member or if they are retired and report that they used to be a union member. **Tables G4-G5** show that the findings are similar when controls for party affiliation are included. The party affiliation measure is based on the ISSP's standardized coding of party groups based on respondents' most recent vote choice. The reference category for these control variables is respondents who did not vote or who voted for a party that does not fall into one of the five party groups included (far left, center left, liberal, conservative, and radical right).

Table G1: Class and attitudes toward protective policies, with union control

	Dependent variable:							
	Support declining		Job guarantee		Restrict imports		Restrict immigration	
Working class (no degree)	0.112***		0.087***		0.129***		0.116***	
	(0.008)		(0.013)		(0.009)		(0.008)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.097***		0.097***		0.104***		0.080***
		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.008)		(0.007)
Female	0.074***	0.075***	0.054***	0.054***	0.055***	0.057***	0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age category	−0.011***	−0.008***	−0.006	−0.004	0.009***	0.013***	0.006+	0.009**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.014*	−0.013**	−0.039***	−0.036***	−0.013**	−0.010**	0.005	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Unemployed	0.031***	0.025***	0.056***	0.051**	0.007	0.006	0.027**	0.027**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Retired	0.003	0.005	−0.005	−0.003	0.020**	0.023***	0.014*	0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Public sector	0.001	0.002	0.010	0.014*	0.002	0.001	−0.021***	−0.024***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Self-employed	−0.035***	−0.029**	−0.041***	−0.035***	0.009	0.015+	−0.007	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Union member	0.018***	0.016***	0.027***	0.026***	0.016**	0.011*	0.001	−0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Constant	0.485***	0.512***	0.428***	0.436***	0.569***	0.599***	0.524***	0.561***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	49,054	49,054	48,804	48,804	40,457	40,457	38,082	38,082
R^2	0.122	0.123	0.164	0.172	0.139	0.135	0.111	0.100

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table G2: Class and attitudes toward compensatory policies, with union control

	Dependent variable:					
	Spend more unemployed		Provide unemployed		Raise taxes high incomes	
Working class (no degree)	0.031***		−0.001		0.025*	
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.012)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.045***		0.026***		0.039***
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.009)
Female	0.017***	0.017***	0.019***	0.019***	0.007+	0.007+
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Age category	0.010***	0.010***	0.007**	0.007**	0.009***	0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.026**	−0.024**	−0.036***	−0.033***	0.005	0.008*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Unemployed	0.096***	0.093***	0.081***	0.080***	0.045***	0.043***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Retired	−0.024*	−0.023*	−0.021**	−0.020*	0.012	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Public sector	0.005	0.009*	0.011*	0.016***	0.030*	0.033**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Self-employed	−0.050***	−0.047***	−0.040***	−0.037***	−0.034***	−0.031***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Union member	0.028***	0.028***	0.029***	0.029***	0.039***	0.039***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	0.336***	0.332***	0.534***	0.516***	0.425***	0.419***
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	48,886	48,886	48,460	48,460	47,077	47,077
R^2	0.166	0.172	0.162	0.164	0.091	0.094

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table G3: Class and attitudes toward protective policies, with party controls

	Dependent variable:							
	Support declining		Job guarantee		Restrict imports		Restrict immigration	
Working class (no degree)	0.103***		0.083***		0.125***		0.111***	
	(0.009)		(0.015)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.095***		0.093***		0.104***		0.081***
		(0.009)		(0.010)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Female	0.071***	0.071***	0.051***	0.050***	0.057***	0.059***	0.011*	0.013*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age category	−0.006*	−0.004	−0.003	−0.001	0.009***	0.013***	0.005	0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.011+	−0.012*	−0.035***	−0.033***	−0.009+	−0.007+	0.002	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Unemployed	0.030*	0.022+	0.043*	0.035+	0.011	0.011	0.029**	0.030**
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Retired	0.000	0.000	−0.005	−0.004	0.017*	0.019**	0.010	0.012*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Public sector	0.004	0.005	0.013+	0.017**	0.006	0.005	−0.016***	−0.019***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Self-employed	−0.034***	−0.030**	−0.039***	−0.034***	0.007	0.014	−0.011*	−0.007
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Far left	0.035*	0.036**	0.082***	0.083***	−0.021+	−0.024*	−0.103***	−0.106***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Center left	0.037***	0.039***	0.030	0.031	−0.018	−0.019	−0.034	−0.036
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Liberal	0.002	0.006	−0.035	−0.031	−0.004	−0.004	−0.021	−0.022
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Conservative	−0.008	−0.001	−0.080***	−0.075***	−0.015	−0.012	0.045*	0.047*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Radical right	0.019	0.023	−0.014	−0.013	0.106***	0.108***	0.154***	0.155***
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Constant	0.430***	0.447***	0.438***	0.441***	0.585***	0.610***	0.531***	0.562***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,227	19,227	19,087	19,087	35,167	35,167	33,161	33,161
R^2	0.146	0.149	0.222	0.229	0.145	0.143	0.137	0.129

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table G4: Class and attitudes toward compensatory policies, with party controls

	Dependent variable:					
	Spend more unemployed		Provide unemployed		Raise taxes high incomes	
Working class (no degree)	0.030***		−0.003		0.034***	
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		0.043***		0.023***		0.033***
		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Female	0.014***	0.014***	0.015***	0.015***	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age category	0.015***	0.015***	0.009***	0.009***	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.012*	−0.010+	−0.021***	−0.017**	0.007	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Unemployed	0.084***	0.082***	0.076***	0.075***	0.042***	0.040***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Retired	−0.025***	−0.023***	−0.020**	−0.018*	0.006	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Public sector	0.006	0.009*	0.005	0.010*	0.031***	0.031***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Self-employed	−0.047***	−0.045***	−0.035***	−0.033***	−0.039***	−0.037***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Far left	0.077***	0.077***	0.072***	0.072***	0.092***	0.092***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Center left	0.033***	0.034***	0.026*	0.026*	0.012	0.012
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Liberal	−0.031**	−0.029**	−0.024*	−0.023*	−0.025*	−0.024*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Conservative	−0.066***	−0.064***	−0.087***	−0.087***	−0.108***	−0.106***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Radical right	−0.056***	−0.058***	−0.080***	−0.085***	−0.032+	−0.031+
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Constant	0.330***	0.325***	0.550***	0.532***	0.511***	0.516***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,664	18,664	19,051	19,051	19,081	19,081
R^2	0.205	0.209	0.217	0.218	0.123	0.123

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix H: Results by country group

Tables H1-H4 below report results by country group. The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland comprise the "Anglophone" group. Given the countries included in the ISSP, Germany, Switzerland, France, and Spain comprise the "Continental" group. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland comprise the "Nordic" group. Japan and South Korea comprise the "East Asian" group. In the analyses below, standard errors are clustered by country, except for the East Asian group, since clustering becomes problematic with only two countries. For ease of presentation, the outcome variables are listed as 'Protect1,' 'Protect2,' and so on. The order of outcomes is the same as those listed in the prior regression tables and in the figures in the main text. **Table H5** reports the results of z-tests for each country group. The class divide over protective measures is significantly different from the class divide over compensatory spending in the Anglophone and Continental country groups but not in the Nordic and East Asian groups.

Table H1: Class and policy preferences — Anglophone countries

	Dependent variable:						
	Protect1	Protect2	Protect3	Protect4	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3
Working class	0.103***	0.094***	0.099***	0.074***	0.039***	0.030+	0.008
(ISCO 4-9)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Female	0.079***	0.043***	0.047***	0.021***	0.015***	0.022***	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Age category	−0.008**	−0.015*	0.013***	0.005	0.013***	0.008+	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.014*	−0.052***	−0.007*	−0.008	−0.049***	−0.056***	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.005)
Unemployed	0.035***	0.028*	−0.002	0.003	0.100***	0.074***	0.017
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Retired	0.006	−0.017+	0.003	0.009	−0.029*	−0.034*	−0.001
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Public sector	−0.004	0.012	0.001	−0.015***	0.017**	0.030***	0.039*
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.018)
Self-employed	−0.036***	−0.043***	−0.009	−0.003	−0.035**	−0.031**	−0.028*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Constant	0.479***	0.488***	0.606***	0.588***	0.337***	0.514***	0.415***
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.045)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,546	16,344	15,286	14,443	16,544	16,108	16,030
R^2	0.124	0.079	0.089	0.086	0.176	0.079	0.037

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table H2: Class and policy preferences — Continental countries

	Dependent variable:						
	Protect1	Protect2	Protect3	Protect4	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3
Working class	0.100***	0.106***	0.114***	0.077***	0.036***	0.018**	0.048***
(ISCO 4-9)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.002)
Female	0.078***	0.068***	0.066***	0.014***	0.014***	0.011+	−0.002
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Age category	−0.009*	−0.002	0.007+	0.011***	0.006+	0.006	0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Employed	−0.002	−0.029***	−0.018**	0.018**	−0.003	−0.011	0.023***
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Unemployed	0.020**	0.046+	0.008	0.058***	0.091**	0.077**	0.050*
	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Retired	0.014	0.000	0.034***	0.027***	−0.006	−0.007	0.023
	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.017)
Public sector	−0.001	0.011	−0.003	−0.021***	0.004	0.012	0.031
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.030)
Self-employed	−0.029	−0.028*	0.031***	−0.005	−0.050***	−0.041***	−0.041**
	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.015)
Constant	0.579***	0.491***	0.479***	0.579***	0.479***	0.577***	0.613***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.058)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.020)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,937	18,853	11,409	10,621	18,770	18,696	17,653
R^2	0.101	0.150	0.124	0.073	0.165	0.177	0.051

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table H3: Class and policy preferences — Nordic countries

	Dependent variable:						
	Protect1	Protect2	Protect3	Protect4	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3
Working class	0.101***	0.111***	0.119***	0.101***	0.075***	0.042***	0.083***
(ISCO 4-9)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Female	0.067***	0.045***	0.055***	−0.020**	0.026***	0.028***	0.027***
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age category	−0.005+	0.011***	0.014**	0.010*	0.025***	0.018***	0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Employed	−0.018*	−0.040***	−0.010	0.019**	−0.022**	−0.031**	−0.006
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Unemployed	0.045*	0.070***	−0.001	0.027**	0.124***	0.121***	0.068***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Retired	−0.005	−0.010	0.032+	0.030***	−0.053***	−0.033*	−0.001
	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Public sector	0.024**	0.037***	0.013***	−0.037***	0.020*	0.016+	0.045***
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Self-employed	−0.060***	−0.070***	0.024	−0.013	−0.074***	−0.058***	−0.067***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Constant	0.487***	0.477***	0.337***	0.562***	0.397***	0.643***	0.335***
	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.028)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,333	9,411	10,100	9,695	9,461	9,488	9,295
R^2	0.087	0.133	0.078	0.091	0.094	0.065	0.103

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table H4: Class and policy preferences — East Asian countries

	Dependent variable:						
	Protect1	Protect2	Protect3	Protect4	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3
Working class	0.041***	0.022*	0.040***	0.058***	0.040***	0.008	0.020*
(ISCO 4-9)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Female	0.057***	0.033***	0.064***	0.030***	0.001	0.016+	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age category	−0.006*	0.017***	0.025***	0.016***	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.006	0.009	0.003	0.001	0.001	−0.008	0.018+
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Unemployed	0.028	0.102***	−0.003	0.036	0.046*	0.085**	0.010
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Retired	0.016	0.076***	0.030	0.012	0.000	0.030	0.006
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Public sector	−0.027+	0.000	0.005	−0.013	−0.011	0.006	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Self-employed	0.005	−0.033**	0.009	0.013	−0.062***	−0.049***	−0.012
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Constant	0.625***	0.390***	0.388***	0.462***	0.478***	0.502***	0.629***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,238	4,196	3,662	3,323	4,111	4,168	4,099
R^2	0.026	0.073	0.068	0.043	0.068	0.035	0.041

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table H5: Test for the significance of the difference of the magnitude of the class divide in support for protective and compensatory measures, by region

Region	Class	Outcome	Compared to	Estimate 1	Estimate 2	Difference	SE
Anglophone	Working class (no degree)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.117	0.003	0.114***	0.017
Anglophone	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.103	0.039	0.064***	0.012
Anglophone	Working class (no degree)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.065	0.003	0.062**	0.022
Anglophone	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.094	0.039	0.055***	0.014
Anglophone	Working class (no degree)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.131	0.003	0.129***	0.018
Anglophone	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.099	0.039	0.060***	0.012
Anglophone	Working class (no degree)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.121	0.003	0.118***	0.020
Anglophone	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.074	0.039	0.035	0.019
Continental	Working class (no degree)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.131	0.037	0.094***	0.017
Continental	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.100	0.036	0.064**	0.021
Continental	Working class (no degree)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.123	0.037	0.086***	0.019
Continental	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.106	0.036	0.071***	0.016
Continental	Working class (no degree)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.161	0.037	0.124***	0.016
Continental	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.114	0.036	0.078***	0.019
Continental	Working class (no degree)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.122	0.037	0.085***	0.017
Continental	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.077	0.036	0.041**	0.014
Nordic	Working class (no degree)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.098	0.060	0.038	0.022
Nordic	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.101	0.075	0.026	0.018
Nordic	Working class (no degree)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.106	0.060	0.046	0.030
Nordic	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.111	0.075	0.036	0.033
Nordic	Working class (no degree)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.113	0.060	0.053*	0.021
Nordic	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.119	0.075	0.045*	0.018
Nordic	Working class (no degree)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.127	0.060	0.067**	0.021
Nordic	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.101	0.075	0.027	0.016
East Asian	Working class (no degree)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.077	0.051	0.027*	0.013
East Asian	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Support declining	Spend more unemp.	0.041	0.040	0.002	0.012
East Asian	Working class (no degree)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.007	0.051	-0.044***	0.013
East Asian	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Job guarantee	Spend more unemp.	0.022	0.040	-0.017	0.012
East Asian	Working class (no degree)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.074	0.051	0.023	0.014
East Asian	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict imports	Spend more unemp.	0.040	0.040	0.001	0.013
East Asian	Working class (no degree)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.041	0.051	-0.009	0.013
East Asian	Working class (ISCO 4-9)	Restrict immigration	Spend more unemp.	0.058	0.040	0.019	0.012

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix J: Heterogeneity in support for protective policies by gender and union membership

This Appendix investigates variation in policy preferences by gender and union membership. To investigate gender differences, I estimate models that take higher-class males as the reference group and estimate coefficients for higher-class females, working-class females, and working-class males. I adopt an equivalent approach for union membership. In all of these models, the reported coefficients tell us the extent to which the attitudes of the group in question differ from the reference group. Given the question of interest, this empirical approach allows for a more intuitive interpretation than an interaction model. An interaction model (e.g., interacting working-class status and an indicator variable for female respondents) would tell us whether the extent of the class gap is greater or smaller among women than it is among men. A negative interaction term would indicate that the extent of the class gap among women is smaller than the extent of the class gap among men, but this could be true even if working-class women were *more* supportive of protective measures than working-class men. The empirical approach adopted here offers a more direct answer to the question at stake in this section of this paper: how the attitudes of working-class women differ from those of higher-class men, higher-class women, and working-class men (and equivalently for union members).

An important constraint is that the ISSP surveys do not collect data on respondents' race or ethnicity (which is why this paper uses the American CES for analysis of demand for protective policies by race). The analysis of ISSP data reported in **Tables J1-J2** below therefore focuses on differences in support for protective measures by gender and union membership. The analysis employs the occupational definition of the working class and includes country and year fixed effects and the individual controls discussed in the preceding section. The results show that working-class women and men are *both* much more supportive of protective measures than are higher-class men (the reference group). Indeed, working-class women are the most supportive of three of these protective measures. **Table J2** shows

that union and non-union members of the working class are both much more supportive of all protective measures than are higher-class non-union members (the reference group). Working-class union members are at least as supportive of all four protective measures as are non-union members of the working class. Higher-class union members have attitudes much more like their higher-class non-union counterparts.

Table J3 reports the results of analysis of support for protective policies in which class is interacted with gender. The coefficient on the interaction term is consistently negative and significant. As discussed above, this does not mean that working-class women are less supportive of protective policies than working-class men are. Rather, this means that the class gap in support for protective policies is smaller among women than among men. As the findings in **Table J1** make clear, women are actually more supportive of most protective policies than men are.

Table J1: Support for protective policies by class and gender, ISSP

	Dependent variable:			
	Support declining	Guarantee jobs	Reduce imports	Reduce immigration
Ref cat: Higher-class male				
Higher-class female	0.104***	0.068***	0.087***	0.017*
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Working-class female	0.173***	0.151***	0.163***	0.090***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Working-class male	0.124***	0.111***	0.132***	0.087***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Age category	−0.007***	−0.002	0.013***	0.009**
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.013***	−0.034***	−0.010***	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Unemployed	0.024***	0.050**	0.004	0.026**
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Retired	0.004	−0.002	0.020**	0.016*
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Public sector	0.004	0.018**	0.001	−0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Self-employed	−0.032**	−0.038***	0.013	−0.003
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Constant	0.498***	0.428***	0.586***	0.558***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.021)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	49,054	48,804	40,457	38,082
R^2	0.125	0.172	0.137	0.100

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table J2: Support for protective policies by class and union membership, ISSP

	Dependent variable:			
	Support declining	Guarantee jobs	Reduce imports	Reduce immigration
Ref cat: Higher-class non-union				
Higher-class union	0.015*	0.028**	0.009	−0.018*
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Working-class union	0.106***	0.116***	0.112***	0.083***
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Working-class non-union	0.100***	0.101***	0.105***	0.073***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Age category	−0.008***	−0.004	0.012***	0.009**
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.035***	−0.052***	−0.026***	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Unemployed	0.006	0.037*	−0.009	0.024*
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Retired	−0.018***	−0.019**	0.004	0.012+
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Public sector	0.012+	0.021***	0.008+	−0.023***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Self-employed	−0.039***	−0.042***	0.007	−0.005
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Constant	0.564***	0.473***	0.640***	0.573***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.022)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	49,054	48,804	40,457	38,082

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table J3: Interaction analysis for gender and support for protective policies

	Dependent variable:			
	Support declining	Guarantee jobs	Reduce imports	Reduce immigration
Working class	0.126***	0.110***	0.129***	0.082***
(ISCO 4-9)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Female	0.105***	0.068***	0.086***	0.011
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age category	−0.007***	−0.002	0.013***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	−0.013**	−0.033***	−0.006	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Unemployed	0.024**	0.051**	0.007	0.027*
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Retired	0.005	−0.002	0.021***	0.020**
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Public sector	0.003	0.017**	0.003	−0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Self-employed	−0.032**	−0.038***	0.014+	−0.005
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Working class × Female	−0.057***	−0.032***	−0.056***	−0.013*
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	0.496***	0.430***	0.581***	0.553***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.022)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	48,279	49,493	39,889	39,953

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix L: CES analysis

This Appendix investigates whether the distinctively high level of working-class support for protective measures is driven solely by working-class citizens who are members of the dominant racial group. Given that the ISSP surveys do not consistently gauge respondents' ethnicity or race, I draw on data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES), a long-running American survey. In 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, the CES asked respondents whether they support tariffs on imports of goods from China. In these four years, it also asked respondents whether they support tariffs on steel and aluminum. In 2018, 2019, and 2020, the CES also asked respondents whether they support a 50% reduction in legal immigration. All of these questions required binary responses. Since the CES does not collect detailed occupational information, I use the educational definition of class in the analysis that follows. Standard errors are clustered by state. **Table L1** below reports the results for variation by gender, race, and union membership. 'HC' stands for higher class. 'WC' stands for working class. Standard errors are robust and clustered by state. Columns 1-3 of Table L1 show that working-class men and women are much more supportive of all three protective measures than are higher-class men and women. Unlike in the ISSP analysis above, however, working-class American men are even more supportive of protective measures than are working-class women. Columns 4-6 of Table L1 analyze differences in support for protective measures by class and racial group, based on four categories of respondent: higher-class white (the reference group), higher-class non-white, working-class non-white, and working-class white. Although white members of the working class are the strongest supporters of all three protective measures, non-white members of the working class are also much more supportive of protective measures, including immigration restrictions, than are white higher-class respondents. Columns 7-9 of Table L1 report an analysis by union membership. Here, too, we see that union and non-union members of the working class are similarly supportive of all three protective measures. **Table L2** reports analyses of the relationship between class and support for protective policies with and without a control for household income, measured

in twelve categories. Adding the income control has little impact on the results. **Table L3** reports summary statistics for the CES data.

Table L1: Class, gender, race, union membership, and support for protective policies (CES)

	Dependent variable:								
	China	Steel	Reduce immig.	China	Steel	Reduce immig.	China	Steel	Reduce immig.
Ref cat: HC male									
HC female	0.002	0.051***	−0.069***						
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)						
WC female	0.095***	0.148***	0.091***						
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)						
WC male	0.141***	0.153***	0.142***						
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)						
Ref cat: HC white									
HC nonwhite				0.044***	0.052***	0.023***			
				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)			
WC nonwhite				0.076***	0.112***	0.084***			
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)			
WC white				0.146***	0.145***	0.184***			
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)			
Ref cat: HC non-union									
HC union							−0.052***	−0.029***	−0.067***
							(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
WC union							0.106***	0.119***	0.113***
							(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
WC non-union							0.105***	0.115***	0.144***
							(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female				−0.029***	0.015***	−0.059***	−0.028***	0.016***	−0.061***
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Age category	0.040***	0.024***	0.060***	0.039***	0.024***	0.059***	0.041***	0.024***	0.062***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Employed	0.012*	0.006+	0.019***	0.012***	0.007*	0.018***	0.013***	0.007*	0.020***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Unemployed	−0.028***	−0.018***	0.010+	−0.025***	−0.016**	0.012*	−0.027***	−0.018***	0.010+
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Retired	0.001	0.013**	−0.016***	0.002	0.014***	−0.016***	0.003	0.015***	−0.012*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Citizen	0.010***	−0.013	0.053***	0.016+	−0.009	0.060***	0.012	−0.013	0.056***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
White	0.029***	0.003	0.056***				0.029***	0.003	0.056***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-clustered SE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	162,467	151,477	136,648	162,467	151,477	136,648	162,301	151,327	136,515
R^2	0.048	0.082	0.076	0.050	0.083	0.079	0.048	0.081	0.078

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table L2: Class and support for protective policies, with and without income control (CES)

	Dependent variable:					
	China tariffs	Steel tariffs	Reduce immigration	China tariffs	Steel tariffs	Reduce immigration
Working class (no degree)	0.125***	0.137***	0.154***	0.132***	0.137***	0.148***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Household income				0.003***	0.0003	−0.003***
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Female	−0.031***	0.020***	−0.056***	−0.029***	0.020***	−0.058***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age category	0.036***	0.024***	0.058***	0.035***	0.024***	0.058***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employed	0.015***	0.006+	0.016***	0.010*	0.006	0.020***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Unemployed	−0.027***	−0.019***	0.010+	−0.025***	−0.019***	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Retired	0.003	0.014*	−0.018*	0.002	0.014*	−0.017*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Citizen	0.011	−0.013	0.051***	0.010	−0.013	0.053***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)
White	0.036***	0.002	0.057***	0.034***	0.002	0.059***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	0.246***	0.426***	0.040**	0.227***	0.424***	0.056***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Income control	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-clustered SE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	121,824	121,824	121,824	121,824	121,824	121,824
R^2	0.044	0.033	0.072	0.044	0.033	0.073

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table L3: Summary Statistics for CES

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Working class (education)	163,472	0.634	0.482	0	1
Female	163,472	0.572	0.495	0	1
Age category	163,472	3.815	1.767	1	7
Employed	163,472	0.493	0.500	0	1
Unemployed	163,472	0.084	0.277	0	1
Retired	163,472	0.216	0.412	0	1
Household income	147,022	6.246	3.305	1	12
Union	163,304	0.178	0.383	0	1
Citizenship	163,472	0.981	0.135	0	1
White	163,472	0.722	0.448	0	1
Tariff China	162,467	0.552	0.497	0	1
Steel tariffs	151,477	0.670	0.470	0	1
Reduce immigration	136,648	0.396	0.489	0	1

Appendix M: Work beliefs and relative appeal of protection

Table M1 below reports the full regression table for the results summarized in Table 1 of the main text.

Table M1: Work beliefs and support for protection over compensation (ESS)

	Dependent variable:	
	Protection over compensation	
	Full sample	Working class only
Benefits make people lazy (1 SD)	0.030***	0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	0.022***	0.013*
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age	−0.009**	−0.009*
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Employed	−0.007	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.012)
Unemployed	−0.006	−0.010
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Retired	0.020*	0.028*
	(0.009)	(0.012)
Public sector	−0.003	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Self-employed	−0.008	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.011)
Constant	−0.167***	−0.132***
	(0.011)	(0.016)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,746	10,749
R^2	0.065	0.057
Adjusted R^2	0.064	0.055
Note:	$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Appendix N: Physical work intensity, work beliefs, and demand for protection

The measure of physical work intensity used in the main text is based on the ISSP Work Orientation's question about how frequently respondents "have to do hard physical work" at their job, with responses on a 5-point scale ranging from "always" to "never." To construct a measure of physical work intensity at the occupational level, I rescale these responses from 0-1 and then compute the average response for respondents in each ISCO 2-digit occupation. I exclude the two occupational groups for which there are not at least 20 valid observations: "subsistence farmers, fishers, hunters, and gatherers" and "street

and related sales and service workers." The measure therefore aggregates 28,841 individual responses into physical work intensity scores for 38 ISCO-08 civilian 2-digit occupations. **Table N1** reports the physical work intensity (PWI) score for each of these occupations. This new PWI variable is modestly positively correlated with skill specificity ($r = 0.209$) and offshorability ($r = 0.165$) and slightly negatively correlated with routine task intensity ($r = -0.047$). The sources for these risk variables are discussed in the main text. Since Rehm's (2016) occupational unemployment rates are computed at the broader ISCO 1-digit level, a similar comparison is not possible.

Table 1: Physical work intensity by ISCO-08 occupational group

ISCO-08	Occupational group	PWI	N
11	Chief executives, senior officials and legislators	0.242	354
12	Administrative and commercial managers	0.171	834
13	Production and specialized services managers	0.270	1077
14	Hospitality, retail and other services managers	0.427	653
21	Science and engineering professionals	0.184	912
22	Health professionals	0.392	966
23	Teaching professionals	0.248	2183
24	Business and administration professionals	0.124	894
25	Information and communications technology professionals	0.111	493
26	Legal, social and cultural professionals	0.160	1028
31	Science and engineering associate professionals	0.340	1043
32	Health associate professionals	0.452	976
33	Business and administration associate professionals	0.180	2301
34	Legal, social, cultural and related associate professionals	0.341	541
35	Information and communications technicians	0.243	226
41	General and keyboard clerks	0.174	1030
42	Customer services clerks	0.217	583
43	Numerical and material recording clerks	0.263	806
44	Other clerical support workers	0.256	607
51	Personal service workers	0.524	1159
52	Sales workers	0.442	1414
53	Personal care workers	0.558	1514
54	Protective services workers	0.394	342
61	Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers	0.694	719
62	Market-oriented skilled forestry, fishery and hunting workers	0.659	55
71	Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians	0.714	991

72	Metal, machinery and related trades workers	0.576	912
73	Handicraft and printing workers	0.404	221
74	Electrical and electronic trades workers	0.527	442
75	Food processing, wood working, garment and other craft workers	0.584	376
81	Stationary plant and machine operators	0.574	639
82	Assemblers	0.526	127
83	Drivers and mobile plant operators	0.523	895
91	Cleaners and helpers	0.603	716
92	Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers	0.640	98
93	Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport	0.640	521
94	Food preparation assistants	0.536	35
96	Refuse workers and other elementary workers	0.601	158

For the analyses that follow, this occupational-level measure is assigned to respondents in other surveys on the basis of their reported occupation. Respondents in the Work Orientations model are also assigned the physical work intensity code for their occupation. This occupation-level physical work intensity variable, rescaled in terms of standard deviations, is then used as the explanatory variable for the analyses reported in Figure 3 and Table 2 of the main text. The full results of the analyses summarized in Figure 3 are reported in **Tables N2-N3 below. Tables N4-N5** report analyses with a sample restricted to working-class women with a valid ISCO code. The results are consistent with those for the full working-class sample. The full version of Table 2 is reported in **Table N6.**

Table N2: Physical work intensity and work beliefs among working-class respondents (ISSP WO, EVS, ISSP SN, ESS)

	Dependent variable:				
	Work important ISSP WO	Money humiliating EVS	No work makes lazy EVS	Benefits lazy (a) ISSP SN	Benefits lazy (b) ESS
Physical work intensity	0.023***	0.014***	0.025***	0.014*	0.016**
(1-SD increase)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	−0.025***	0.011	−0.029**	−0.011	0.013
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Age	0.039***	0.008**	0.000	−0.003	−0.010*
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Employed	−0.007	0.044**	0.083***	0.071***	0.048***
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.008)
Unemployed	0.052***	−0.023	−0.033	−0.030	−0.069**
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Retired	0.034+	0.050**	0.107***	0.039+	0.053**
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.017)
Self-employed	0.042*	0.006	−0.010	0.038***	0.046***
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Constant	0.271***	0.478***	0.497***	0.543***	0.481***
	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.024)
Working-class sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,163	7,470	7,474	6,989	8,653
R^2	0.102	0.021	0.063	0.076	0.067

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table N3: Physical work intensity and support for protection among working-class respondents (ISSP RG and NI)

	Dependent variable:			
	Support declining	Employment guarantee	Reduce imports	Reduce immigrants
Physical work intensity	0.021***	0.026***	0.029***	0.009**
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	0.061***	0.056***	0.053***	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age	−0.005**	−0.001	0.015***	0.010**
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.004	−0.032***	0.007	0.012
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Unemployed	0.014*	0.043*	0.011	0.028+
	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Retired	0.004	0.002	0.035***	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Self-employed	−0.051***	−0.068***	0.003	−0.001
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	0.561***	0.442***	0.592***	0.601***
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.028)
Working-class sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	24,676	24,590	19,524	18,617
R^2	0.077	0.160	0.108	0.093

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table N4: Physical work intensity and work beliefs among working-class women (ISSP WO, EVS, ISSP SN, ESS)

	Dependent variable:				
	Work important ISSP WO	Money humiliating EVS	No work makes lazy EVS	Benefits lazy (a) ISSP SN	Benefits lazy (b) ESS
Physical work intensity	0.028***	0.018***	0.027***	0.004	0.011*
(1-SD increase)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Age	0.035***	0.007*	0.002	−0.0001	−0.007
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Employed	−0.001	0.034	0.094***	0.056**	0.047***
	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.011)
Unemployed	0.031	−0.016	−0.019	−0.001	−0.026
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Retired	0.059**	0.051**	0.126***	0.033	0.043+
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Self-employed	0.022	−0.001	−0.034	0.007	0.044+
	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Constant	0.216***	0.491***	0.443***	0.567***	0.497***
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.021)
Working-class women	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	No	No	No	No
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,562	3,934	3,924	3,697	4,324
R^2	0.093	0.029	0.072	0.077	0.071

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table N5: Physical work intensity and support for protection among working-class women (ISSP RG and NI)

	Dependent variable:			
	Support declining	Employment guarantee	Reduce imports	Reduce immigrants
Phyiscal work intesnity	0.022***	0.035***	0.027***	0.004
(1-SD increase)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	−0.003+	−0.001	0.018***	0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Employed	0.007	−0.028**	0.005	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Unemployed	0.002	0.013	0.009	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Retired	0.002	0.004	0.031***	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Self-employed	−0.040**	−0.049**	0.018+	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Constant	0.616***	0.466***	0.649***	0.627***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.032)
Working-class women	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,401	12,342	9,808	9,319
R^2	0.070	0.161	0.114	0.092

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001


Table N6: Physical work intensity and support for protection over compensation, full sample and working-class only, ISSP

	Dependent variable:	
	Protection over compensation	
	Full sample	Working class only
Work physicality (1 SD)	0.032***	0.015***
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	0.044***	0.038***
	(0.006)	(0.005)
Age category	−0.012***	−0.010*
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Employed	−0.008	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.010)
Unemployed	−0.030***	−0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Retired	0.018*	0.024*
	(0.007)	(0.010)
Public sector	−0.004	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Self-employed	−0.010	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.009)
Constant	−0.110***	−0.059**
	(0.022)	(0.021)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	44,887	24,076
R^2	0.047	0.038
Adjusted R^2	0.046	0.037
Note:	*Note:*. $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Appendix O: Risk variables


To understand the distribution of employment risks across classes, **Figures O1-O2** report four forms of labor market disadvantage by 1-digit ISCO group, coded according to the class within which each group falls. In **Figure O1**, each 1-digit group is plotted in a two-dimensional space in which the value on the horizontal axis is the average unemployment rate for that occupational group. This measure was developed and made available by Rehm (2016). Here, I report average occupational unemployment rates for 1996, 2006, and

Figure O1: Unemployment and skill specificity by ISCO group, 1996-2016



2016, reflecting the years of the rounds of the ISSP Role of Government survey. The value on the vertical axis captures the average level of skill specificity within each occupational group. Skill specificity refers to the transferability or non-transferability of a worker's skills across occupations. Workers with more specific skills are typically thought to face higher costs of job loss because they are less likely to be able to find new work at an equivalent pay if they lose their existing jobs. I draw on a measure of skill specificity made available by Pardos-Prado and Xena (2019), which is based on the method developed by Iversen and Soskice (2001). The countries included are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland, and Switzerland. The figure shows that, on average, individuals in working-class occupations face a higher risk of becoming unemployed than do their higher-class counterparts: every working-class occupational group has a higher average unemployment rate than does every higher-class occupational group. When it comes to skill specificity, the distribution is somewhat more varied, but skill specificity is by far the highest in traditional 'blue collar' working-class occupations.

Figure O2: Routine task intensity and offshorability by ISCO group



Two additional forms of labor market disadvantage are reported in **Figure O2**. The horizontal axis reports routine task intensity, which is the standard measure of the exposure of workers in a given occupation to displacement by automation (Autor and Dorn 2013). The vertical axis reports offshorability, which is a standard measure of 'globalization risk' and captures the extent to which the tasks performed by workers in a given occupation can be performed by workers in another country (Blinder and Krueger 2013). The name notwithstanding, this measure is meant to capture not only what is colloquially referred to as "offshoring" but also import competition: in both cases, the job performed by a worker in a given country is being performed by workers in another country. Both are time- and country-invariant measures that I draw from Goos et al. (2014). As the figure shows, almost all working-class occupational groups face a higher risk of technological displacement than do higher-class occupational groups. The same is true of offshorability. The working-class group that is classified as the least routine-intensive (machine operators and assemblers) is particularly exposed to competition from abroad.

These figures make clear that working-class citizens are, in general, more exposed to labor market risks than are their higher-class counterparts. The figures also capture important within-class variation in risk exposure. This variation is even more visible if we move from the ISCO 1-digit level to the ISCO 2-digit level, which is the level at which skill specificity, offshorability, and routine task intensity are measured. If the class divide in respondents' policy preferences reflects variation in respondents' own risk exposure as individuals, the magnitude and significance of the class should attenuate once these individual-level controls are introduced. If the class divide persists after the addition of controls for individual-level risks, this suggests that the class divide is not reducible to variation in respondents' individual risk exposure, as argued in this paper.

Tables O1-O2 below replicate the paper's results on policy preferences with controls for individual-level risks, drawn from the aforementioned sources. The sample is restricted to respondents in the labor force (employed or unemployed). Given that the coverage of Pardos-Prado and Xena's data do not fully overlap with the years covered in the ISSP, I take the average value for each ISCO 2-digit occupational group for each country in their sample. Routine task intensity and offshorability at the ISCO 2-digit level is time- and country-invariant. The sample size for the analyses here is reduced because Rehm's (2016) occupational unemployment rate data and Pardos-Prado and Xena (2019)'s skill specificity data only cover European countries. All four of the risk variables are normalized so that the coefficient indicates the 'effect' of a 1-standard-deviation increase in risk on the outcome. The sample is restricted to respondents in the labor force (employed or unemployed). The tables report estimates with the occupational and educational definitions of class discussed in the main text. The results of these analyses are consistent with the baseline findings reported in Appendix F: the inclusion of the individual-level risk variables does not eliminate or attenuate the relationship between class and support for protection. **Table O3** replicates the analysis of the relationship between physical work intensity and support for protection with the risk controls. As noted in the main text, the coefficient on physical work intensity retains a

similar magnitude and remains significant except in the case of support for immigration restrictions. **Table O4** replicates the analysis of the relationship between physical work intensity and support for protection over compensation (Table 2 in the main text) with the risk controls. The results are largely unchanged.

Table O1: Class and support for protection, with risk controls

	Dependent variable:							
	Support declining		Job guarantee		Restrict imports		Restrict immigration	
Working class	0.111***		0.099***		0.129***		0.072***	
(ISCO 4–9)	(0.008)		(0.014)		(0.007)		(0.010)	
Working class		0.102***		0.093***		0.137***		0.118***
(no degree)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.007)
Unemployment risk	0.005	0.030^{+}	0.024***	0.046***	−0.0004	0.018	0.017	0.021^{+}
(1-SD increase)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Skill specificity	0.012***	0.015***	0.008**	0.010**	0.013**	0.013*	0.009*	0.008*
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Routine task intensity	−0.009*	0.012*	−0.014**	0.004	−0.011*	0.012^{+}	−0.002	0.008*
(1-SD increase)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Offshorability	0.002	−0.004	0.001	−0.003	0.0004	−0.004	−0.002	−0.005
(1-SD increase)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	0.087***	0.083***	0.068***	0.064***	0.070***	0.065***	0.010	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Age category	−0.010***	−0.013***	−0.002	−0.004^{+}	0.005^{+}	0.001	0.009***	0.006*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.022*	−0.015^{+}	−0.077***	−0.072***	−0.012	−0.006	−0.0003	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Public sector	−0.040*	−0.043**	−0.026*	−0.029**	0.003	−0.001	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Self-employed	0.009	0.012	0.023**	0.025*	0.010^{+}	0.015*	−0.018***	−0.011***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Constant	0.604***	0.590***	0.561***	0.548***	0.467***	0.424***	0.552***	0.488***
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.106)	(0.101)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,878	14,878	14,832	14,832	10,958	10,958	10,339	10,339
R^2	0.138	0.139	0.147	0.148	0.119	0.130	0.089	0.112

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table O2: Class and support for compensation, labor force sample, with risk controls

	Dependent variable:					
	Spend more unemployed		Provide unemployed		Raise taxes high incomes	
Working class	0.070***		0.031*		0.058***	
(ISCO 4–9)	(0.016)		(0.014)		(0.017)	
Working class		0.033**		−0.004		0.025*
(no degree)		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.010)
Unemployment risk	−0.0002	0.021*	0.007	0.019**	0.003	0.021*
(1-SD increase)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Skill specificity	0.003	0.006+	0.003	0.005*	0.014***	0.016***
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Routine task intensity	−0.014**	0.001	−0.008	0.001	0.005	0.018***
(1-SD increase)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Offshorability	0.005+	0.001	0.004	0.003	−0.008+	−0.011*
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	0.025***	0.024***	0.021***	0.021***	0.014*	0.012+
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age category	0.014**	0.013**	0.011**	0.011**	0.019***	0.019***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.106***	−0.103***	−0.092**	−0.091**	−0.029+	−0.026
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Public sector	−0.052***	−0.054***	−0.032**	−0.033**	−0.052***	−0.054***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Self-employed	0.014*	0.013	0.019**	0.017*	0.036***	0.035**
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Constant	0.534***	0.552***	0.635***	0.658***	0.626***	0.643***
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,940	14,940	14,800	14,800	14,268	14,268
R^2	0.172	0.164	0.173	0.172	0.107	0.103

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table O3: Physical work intensity and support for protection, working-class labor force sample, with risk controls (ISSP RG and NI)

	Dependent variable:			
	Support declining	Employment guarantee	Reduce imports	Reduce immigrants
Work physicality	0.019***	0.019***	0.024***	−0.001
(1-SD increase)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Unemployment risk	0.003	0.017*	−0.003	0.013
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Skill specificity	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.011+
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Routine task intensity	−0.008*	−0.006	0.001	−0.003
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Offshorability	0.003	0.0003	0.001	−0.004
(1-SD increase)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	0.068***	0.062***	0.051***	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Age category	−0.010***	−0.001	0.007**	0.006+
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.009	−0.063***	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Self-employed	−0.051*	−0.065***	−0.027+	0.004
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Constant	0.667***	0.587***	0.515***	0.584***
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.112)
Working-class sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Employed or unemployed sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,997	7,983	6,031	5,816
R^2	0.077	0.121	0.060	0.083

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table O4: Physical work intensity and support for protection over compensation, full labor force sample and working-class labor force sample, with risk controls (ISSP RG)

	Dependent variable:	
	Protection over compensation	
	Full sample	Working class only
Work physicality	0.032***	0.011***
(1-SD increase)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Unemployment risk	0.015***	0.014*
(1-SD increase)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Skill specificity	−0.0003	0.004
(1-SD increase)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Routine task intensity	0.009	0.001
(1-SD increase)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Offshorability	−0.002	−0.005
(1-SD increase)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Female	0.047***	0.039***
	(0.008)	(0.011)
Age category	−0.013***	−0.014**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Employed	0.017	0.023
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Public sector	0.004	0.014
	(0.008)	(0.010)
Self-employed	0.002	−0.010
	(0.008)	(0.012)
Constant	−0.118***	−0.032
	(0.027)	(0.025)
Working-class sample	No	Yes
Employed or unemployed sample	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,543	7,752
R^2	0.066	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.065	0.055

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix P: Testing the insider-outsider divide

The analysis below examines the relationship between class, employment status, and demand for protection. The analysis compares the reference group of higher-class respondents to unemployed higher-class respondents, employed working-class respondents, and unemployed working-class respondents. Other groups are excluded from the analysis. The purpose of this analysis is not to engage with every variant of insider-outsider theory in the literature, but simply to test a straightforward observable implication of these theories as applied to the problems studied in this paper: namely, that working-class demand for protection should reflect the demands of employed members of the working class, not the unemployed. This is not what we observe, as is clear from **Table P1**: if anything, unemployed members of the working class are more supportive of protective measures than are employed members of the working class, and both groups are considerably more supportive of these measures than their higher-class counterparts.

Table P1: Class, employment status, and support for protection, ISSP

	Dependent variable:			
	Support declining	Job guarantee	Restrict imports	Restrict immigration
Ref. cat: employed higher class				
Unemployed higher class	0.069^{***}	0.090^{***}	0.026^{+}	0.045^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Employed working class	0.103^{***}	0.095^{***}	0.108^{***}	0.090^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployed working class	0.125^{***}	0.182^{***}	0.115^{***}	0.102^{***}
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Female	0.080^{***}	0.054^{***}	0.055^{***}	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age category	-0.011^{***}	-0.006	0.009^{***}	0.006^{+}
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Public sector	0.002	0.021^{**}	0.002	-0.021^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Self-employed	-0.037^{***}	-0.041^{***}	0.010	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	33,312	33,046	27,760	25,925
R^2	0.128	0.162	0.125	0.097
Adjusted R^2	0.128	0.161	0.124	0.097

Note: Reference category is employed higher-class respondents. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix Q: trade exposure and support for trade protection

The analysis below examines whether the class divide in support for trade protection is reducible to differences in personal exposure to competition from abroad. Focusing solely on employed respondents who are not self-employed, I first split the sample into those in the private sector and those in the public sector. While private-sector jobs vary in their exposure to competition from abroad and some are entirely non-tradable, almost all public sector jobs are non-tradable. Given the lack of information about respondents' industry of employment, this is the only feasible way of roughly distinguishing between tradable and non-tradable sectors. If the class divide was really a function of differences in personal exposure to competition from abroad, we should see a larger class divide among respondents in the private sector than in the public sector, since public sector employees are insulated from competition from abroad and face the cost of trade protection in the form of higher prices. Yet as we see in the first two columns of **Table Q1**, there is only a small difference in the estimates for the class divide in the private sector and the public sector, and the difference is not statistically distinguishable from zero (p-value 0.390). The second approach adopted here is to split respondents into occupations with above-median offshorability and below-median offshorability, using Blinder and Krueger's (2013) occupational measure of offshorability. This measure captures not only "offshoring" in the narrow colloquial sense (when a company relocates production abroad) but also the feasibility of foreign workers employed by foreign companies performing tasks within a certain occupation (as, e.g., when American textile manufacturing jobs were "offshored" to China, an example used by Blinder and Krueger themselves). Columns three and four show an even larger class divide among respondents in occupations that are less exposed to offshoring, and this difference is highly significant (p-value 0.001). These findings are difficult to reconcile with an account based on personal exposure to foreign competition but are consistent with the class-based account of parochially sociotropic preferences proposed in this paper.

Table Q1: Class and support for import restrictions by sector and occupational offshorability (ISSP NI)

	Dependent variable:			
	Restrict imports			
	Private sector	Public sector	High offshorability	Low offshorability
Working class (ISCO 4–9)	0.110***	0.097***	0.077***	0.125***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Female	0.048***	0.073***	0.031***	0.067***
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age category	0.007*	0.005^{+}	0.006^{+}	0.008***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Public sector			0.008	0.002
			(0.006)	(0.006)
Dependently employed sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	15,300	7,612	8,291	11,454
R^2	0.135	0.118	0.117	0.149

Note: $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix R: Retired vs. active respondents

The analyses in **Tables R1-R2** compare the class gap in beliefs and policy preferences among respondents in the labor force (employed or unemployed) to the class gap among retirees. These analysis use the occupational definition of class (for retirees, class is defined by former occupation). Coefficients are based on regressions that include the full set of control variables. **Table R1** shows that there is no significant difference in the magnitude of the class gap among economically active respondents and among retirees, except in the case of the question about whether it is humiliating to receive money without working – there is considerably less class-based disagreement on this question among retirees than among economically active respondents. Taken together, the results in Table R1 suggests that the class divide in beliefs about work persist into retirement. **Table R2** conducts a similar analysis for policy preferences. Here, too, there is little consistent difference in the magnitude of the class divide among economically active respondents and among retired respondents: the difference between the two coefficients is generally insignificant. The table suggests that there is a somewhat larger class divide among retirees when it comes to an employment guarantee and somewhat less of a class divide when it comes to taxing high incomes. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with the view that the class gap in policy preferences is primarily driven by immediate pocketbook self-interest relating to differences in labor market exposure: if this were true, we would expect to see a considerable convergence in the attitudes of retired respondents, even if they retain some indirectly self-interested concern with the labor market fortunes of their relatives. But we observe no consistent decline in the class divide among retirees, suggesting that the class gap in policy preferences is driven by factors other than immediate self-interest.

Table R1: Class gaps in work beliefs by retirement status

Outcome	Class gap among active respondents	Class gap among retired respondents	Difference in class gaps	p-value	N
Work most important	0.055*** (0.008)	0.037* (0.013)	-0.018 (0.013)	0.215	8262
Money humiliating	0.046*** (0.008)	0.016 (0.011)	-0.030** (0.009)	0.008	31382
Lazy without work	0.075*** (0.009)	0.068** (0.016)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.588	31430
Benefits lazy (EVS)	0.070*** (0.013)	0.056* (0.021)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.552	12957
Benefits lazy (ESS)	0.064*** (0.012)	0.054** (0.012)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.494	24563

Table R2: Class gaps in policy preferences by retirement status

Outcome	Class gap among active respondents	Class gap among retired respondents	Difference in class gaps	p-value	N
Support declining	0.101*** (0.008)	0.095*** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.009)	0.495	41526
Employment guarantee	0.093*** (0.009)	0.125*** (0.010)	0.031** (0.008)	0.001	41267
Restrict imports	0.108*** (0.009)	0.121*** (0.007)	0.013 (0.010)	0.181	34525
Restrict immigration	0.087*** (0.009)	0.064*** (0.008)	-0.023+ (0.012)	0.076	32505
Spend more unemp.	0.047*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.132	41428
provide unemployed	0.021* (0.007)	0.033** (0.011)	0.012 (0.009)	0.192	40993
Tax high incomes	0.044*** (0.008)	0.024+ (0.013)	-0.019* (0.008)	0.025	39963

Appendix S: Social investment policies

The table below reports the estimated class divide for three 'social investment' policies: spending more on education, providing financial support to university students from lower-income families, and spending more on retraining at the expense of unemployment benefits. The table shows that working-class respondents are generally less supportive of increasing education spending and increasing retraining at the expense of unemployment benefits than their higher-class counterparts. When it comes to financial support for lower-income students, we observe no significant class gap with the educational definition of class and mildly higher working-class support with the occupational definition of class. Overall, these results make clear that the class divide over social investment policies is very different from the divide over protective policies, even though both social investment and protective policies could be described as 'predistribution.'

Table S1: Class and support for social investment policies

	Dependent variable:					
	Spend more education		Provide students		Training over compensation	
Working class (no degree)	−0.015*		0.005		−0.008*	
	(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.004)	
Working class (ISCO 4-9)		−0.014*		0.021***		−0.017***
		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Female	0.011**	0.010**	0.012***	0.012***	−0.005	−0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age category	−0.006***	−0.007***	−0.003	−0.003	−0.010**	−0.010**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employed	−0.006	−0.006	−0.029***	−0.026***	0.009	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Unemployed	−0.003	−0.002	0.011	0.010	−0.061***	−0.055***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Retired	−0.011***	−0.012***	−0.016***	−0.014**	0.019*	0.018+
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Public sector	−0.006	−0.006	−0.008	−0.007	0.025+	0.026
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Self-employed	0.010*	0.010*	0.012***	0.015***	−0.0001	−0.0005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	0.748***	0.745***	0.734***	0.724***	0.613***	0.613***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	49,580	49,580	49,308	49,308	16,975	16,044
R^2	0.069	0.069	0.110	0.111	0.044	0.047

Note: +p¡0.1; *p¡0.05; **p¡0.01; ***p¡0.001


Appendix T: Working-class familial networks

To examine whether working-class people tend to exist in working-class familial networks (and vice versa for higher-class people), I draw on the ISSP's Social Networks survey (2017). The survey asks respondents whether they have a family member or relative in several specific occupations. I code the variable 'working-class family' as a 1 if the respondent reports having a family member or relative who is a bus driver, home or office cleaner, hairdresser, or mechanic (and a 0 otherwise). I code the variable 'higher-class family' as a 1 if the respondent reports having a family member who is a business executive, human resources manager, lawyer, or teacher. The results show that working-class respondents are much more likely to have a family member in at least one of the select working-class occupations, while higher-class respondents are much more likely to have a family member in at least one of the select higher-class occupations.

Table T1: Class and family networks

	Dependent variable:	
	Working-class family	Higher-class family
Working class (ISCO 4-9)	0.099^{***}	-0.105^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Female	0.024^{**}	0.044^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age category	-0.014^{***}	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employed	0.024^{+}	-0.027^{*}
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Unemployed	-0.015	-0.139^{***}
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Retired	-0.003	0.020
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Public sector	-0.016	-0.017
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Self-employed	-0.005	0.034^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	0.376^{***}	0.569^{***}
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,354	14,406
R^2	0.026	0.081
Note:	$^{+}$p¡0.1; *p¡0.05; **p¡0.01; ***p¡0.001	

Figure U1: Industrial employment share in advanced democracies, 1980-2016



Appendix U: Trends in advanced democracies

This Appendix presents evidence for the trends mentioned in the paper's concluding section: the declining industrial employment share, rising import penetration, and increased immigration that advanced democracies have experienced in recent decades. The data is drawn from Brady, Huber, and Stephens' Comparative Welfare States data set.[1] The countries included below are the same 16 countries included in the analyses in the main text. **Figure U1** reports the industrial employment share in these sixteen countries between 1980 and 2016. **Figure U2** reports the average value of manufacturing imports from the Global South per industrial worker in 2015 dollars. Following Brady et al. (2020), the 'Global South' refers to non-OECD countries plus the formerly socialist countries of central and eastern Europe. **Figure U3** reports the foreign-born share of the population in the same sixteen countries since 1980 in 5-year intervals. The sources for these data are reported in Brady et al. (2020).

[1]Brady, David, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens. 2020. Comparative Welfare States Dataset. University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

Figure U2: Global South manufacturing imports per industrial worker in advanced democracies, 1980-2016




Figure U3: Foreign-born share of population in advanced democracies, 1980-2016

